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Abstract 
The paper re-expresses arguments against the normative validity of expected utility theory in 
Robin Pope (1983, 1991a, 1991b, 1985, 1995, 2000, 2001, 2005, 2006, 2007).  These concern 
the neglect of the evolving stages of knowledge ahead (stages of what the future will bring).  
Such evolution is fundamental to an experience of risk, yet not consistently incorporated even 
in  axiomatised  temporal  versions  of  expected  utility.    Its n e g l e c t  e n t a i l s  a  d i s r e g a r d  o f  
emotional and financial effects on well-being before a particular risk is resolved.   
These are arguments are complemented with an analysis of the essential uniqueness property 
in the context of temporal and atemporal expected utility theory and a proof of the absence of 
a limit property natural in an axiomatised approach to temporal expected utility theory. 
Problems  of  the  time  structure  of  risk  are  investigated  in  a  simple  temporal  framework 
restricted to a subclass of temporal lotteries in the sense of David Kreps and Evan Porteus 
(1978).  This subclass is narrow but wide enough to discuss basic issues.  It will be shown 
that  there  are  serious  objections  against  the  modification  of  expected  utility  theory 
axiomatised by Kreps and Porteus (1978, 1979).  By contrast the umbrella theory proffered by 
Pope that she has now termed SKAT, the Stages of Knowledge Ahead Theory, offers an 
epistemically consistent framework within which to construct particular models to deal with 
particular decision situations.  A model by Caplin and Leahy (2001) will also be discussed 
and contrasted with the modelling within SKAT (Pope, Leopold and Leitner 2006).   
 
Introduction 
In their pioneering work on dynamic choice theory, David Kreps and Evan Porteus 
(1978, 1979) explicitly consider the timing of the resolution of risk in their recursive 
construction of a space of “temporal lotteries”.  They axiomatize a generalisation of 
von Neumann-Morgenstern utility to this space. 
In the context of preferences on stochastic income streams induced from preferences 
for consumption streams, the importance of resolution times has received attention (eg 
Mossin, 1969, Drèze and Modigliani 1972, Spence and Zeckhauser 1972).  However, 
with  their  space  of  temporal  lotteries  Kreps  and  Porteus  created  a  basic  decision 
theoretic structure for an adequate treatment of problems arising from the influence of 
resolution times on preferences over distributions of time sequences of future events. 
Undoubtedly this structure was a path-breaking conceptual innovation.  However, we 
shall  raise  serious  objections  to  the  generalisation  of  von  Neumann-Morgenstern 
utility axiomatized by Kreps and Porteus. 
                                                 
*  The paper adopts the simple temporal framework of Robin Pope (1983) and later including the 
argument of Pope (2006) that epistemic consistency is not achieved in the models of Kreps and 
Porteus and Caplin and Leahy, given their substitution axioms.  The text was written primarily by 
Reinhard  Selten  who  also  contributed  the  material  on  the  limit  property  and  the  modified 
expectations property, the proofs in the appendices and the examples.  We thank for very helpful 
comments an anonymous referee of this journal, and for auxiliary assistance Amira Allam, Andreas 
Orland, Kanishka Hiththetiya and Patrick Partington of Bonn University. Pope Selten Risk and EUT    11:37 AM, Saturday, 28 November 2009  2 
Consider a decision maker who at time point t = 0 must decide whether to take a 
business opportunity or not.  At the later time point t = 10, this business opportunity 
will either yield a gain W > 0, or a loss L < 0.  Winning W has the probability ! where 
0 < ! < 1.  There are no costs in taking this business opportunity, so the loss L has the 
complementary probability 1-!. 
Is this everything the decision maker needs to know? The decision maker lacks a 
further piece of information.  When will she know whether she will win W or lose L? 
Suppose that she will know at a point !, one of the points 1, … 9.  At ! the risk is 
resolved, in the sense that, from then on, but not before, the probability of a gain is no 
longer ! but either 0 or 1.  At time point !, her knowledge ahead of whether she will 
win or lose has changed from being limited to possibilities (probabilities), to being 
full knowledge ahead, to certainty.  Since at time ! the risk is resolved, we term ! the 
resolution time. We assume that the decision maker knows at her point of choice t = 0 
the exact resolution time !. 
If for instance ! = 1, she will learn whether she won or lost a whole nine periods 
ahead of when she receives her gain or pays out for her loss.  An early resolution time 
(! small) has planning advantages as regards her response to already known business 
opportunities at t = 0 and to new business opportunities that were unknown to her at 
the point of choice t = 0 but become known to her after !.  If she learns early that she 
has made a gain, she is free soon after making the decision to commit herself fully to 
paying back a loan on the gain in order to finance such new business opportunities.   
Optimising the inter-temporal consumption path was the focus of Kreps and Porteus.  
In having the risk resolved early (! small), so that she learns soon whether she has 
made a gain or a loss, the decision maker can plan and implement a beneficially 
smoother consumption path. If she learns soon that she has made a loss, she can more 
smoothly reduce her consumption.  Conversely she can more smoothly increase her 
consumption if she learns soon that she has made a gain. 
In view of such planning advantages as regards investments and consumption, the 
business opportunity at time t = 0 is more attractive the earlier the risk is resolved. 
However, especially as regards emotional advantages, the opposite preference for a 
late resolution time is also possible. Consider buying a lottery ticket for 2 dollars that 
yields a very high gain of say, 1 million dollars, with a small probability 1/1,000,000. 
In this case the main benefit from the purchase of the ticket may be the hope of 
gaining one million. Then it may be advantageous to maintain this hope as long as 
possible, such that a late resolution time increases the attraction of the lottery ticket. Pope Selten Risk and EUT    11:37 AM, Saturday, 28 November 2009  3 
It is of course possible that the risk is gradually resolved at a sequence of resolution 
times !1, !2,  … !K.  Her degree of knowledge ahead in this case increases from !1, !2, 
!3… and reaches certainty, full knowledge ahead, of whether she won or lost, at time 
point !K.  In a modified version of our simple example, the probability ! of a gain 
could change to ! 1 at !1 and to !2 at !2 etc until finally !K = 0 or !K = 1 pertains at 
time point !K.  Moreover one could have probabilistic rather than exact knowledge of 
resolution times.  All this is possible within the space of temporal lotteries of Kreps 
and Porteus. 
In this paper we consider only that subset of the space of temporal lotteries that we 
term simple.  This is the subset of lotteries in which all risk is resolved at a single 
exactly known resolution time and the risk is numerical, in the form of a probability 
distribution over outcomes.  Since in this paper we do not consider decision situations 
with  more  complex  choices,  we  can  for  brevity  term  simple  temporal  lotteries 
‘choices’, and the set of all simple temporal lotteries, the ‘choice space’.  We further 
assume a finite outcome space and consider decision situations with a finite number 
of choices. We refer to this set of assumptions and restrictions on what we consider as 
the ‘simple temporal framework’.  
Our focus on this narrow subset of the space of temporal lotteries serves the purpose 
of  concentrating  on  basic  conceptual  issues  without  deflecting  attention  to 
mathematical detail.  We restrict attention to finite sets as much as possible and where 
this  cannot  be  done,  we  only  look  at  compact  (closed  and  bounded)  subsets  of 
Euclidean space.  The presentation is intentionally kept on a very elementary level.  
We hope that in this way we can also reach readers who are easily discouraged by 
abstract mathematical formalism.  
The objections raised in this paper against the modified expected utility concept of 
Kreps and Porteus remain valid in their more general framework, eg if two properties 
of a utility function are incompatible in the simple temporal framework, they are also 
incompatible  in  the  more  general  framework  of  Kreps  and  Porteus.    The  simple 
temporal framework is an easily accessible source of examples and counterexamples 
yielding theoretically important intuitive insights. 
In this paper a choice is described as a pair c = (p0, !), namely (i) a probability 
distribution p0 over the outcomes, and (ii) a resolution time !. The distribution p0 
reflects the state of knowledge at the time t = 0, the point of choice. A decision 
situation is simply a set of two or any finite larger number of choices. 
We shall argue, that the axiomatization of a temporal expected utility by Kreps and 
Porteus  remains  unsatisfactory  in  view  of  their  use  of  the  substitution  axiom,  on Pope Selten Risk and EUT    11:37 AM, Saturday, 28 November 2009  4 
account of the consistency and plausibility issues discussed already in Robin Pope 
(2006) and in (Pope, Leitner, Leopold 2006, 2009). As we shall see in section 7, this 
axiom lacks an intuitive interpretation, and an example is presented in which plausible 
preferences violate the substitution axiom.  However it is not the purpose of this paper 
to propose a new axiomatised temporal utility.  On the contrary, we want to convince 
the reader of our point of view, that axiomatization is far less important than a careful 
analysis  of  all  relevant  satisfactions  and  dissatisfactions  in  concrete  decision 
situations, as recommended by SKAT, the Stages of Knowledge Ahead Theory (Pope, 
Leitner, Leopold 2006, 2009).  Nevertheless it is necessary to look at some particular 
properties of utility functions and their reasonableness without going the full way 
towards axiomatization.   
Sections 2 and 3 present the simple temporal framework and arrive at a complete 
overview over all the choices within this framework.  In section 3 we look at two 
statements about expected utility:  
(I)   the expectation property;  
and  
(II)  the essential uniqueness property. 
Property (I) means that the utility of a distribution over outcomes is the expected 
value of the utilities of the outcomes with respect to this distribution.  Property (II) 
asserts the uniqueness of the utility function up to the zero point and the unit of 
measurement.  It is shown in Appendix 4 that for a finite outcome set the essential 
uniqueness property (II) is a consequence of the expectation property (I).   
In  the  simple  temporal  framework  a  utility  function  defined  for  outcomes  and 
distributions over outcomes is inadequate.  Therefore in section 6 we look at utility 
functions defined for choices and also for pairs (x, !) where x is an outcome and ! is a 
resolution time.  The more general approach of Kreps and Porteus restricted to the 
simple  temporal  framework  leads  to  these  “modified”  utility  functions.    In  turn, 
insofar  as  these  modified  utility  functions  preserve  expected  utility  maximization, 
they have the following modified expectation property. 
Modified Expectation Property (I') 
The utility u(p0, !) of a choice c is the expected value of the 
utilities u(x, !) where x is distributed according to p0.  
It will be shown in section 6 that, unlike in the case of ordinary expected utility, the 
modified expectation property does not imply essential uniqueness.  
In the context of axiomatised expected utility theory a natural requirement for a utility 
function u(p0, !) defined for choices (p0, !) in the simple temporal framework is the 
following limit property.  Pope Selten Risk and EUT    11:37 AM, Saturday, 28 November 2009  5 
Limit property (III)   
The  influence  on  utility  of  the  resolution  time  !  becomes 
weaker and weaker as the probability p0(x) converges to 1 
and vanishes in the limit.  
Why should it matter much when the risk is resolved, if the decision maker knows at 
the point of choice that a particular outcome x will be reached with virtual certainty?  
After all in the limit such a choice is virtually riskless at the point of choice.  In our 
view  the  limit  property  (III)  is  such  a  natural  extension  of  the  usual  continuity 
requirements of axiomatised expected utility that it is hard to imagine how a deviation 
from this limit property can be intuitively justified by any who accept these other 
continuity requirements.   
Note that Limit property III concerns a progressively weaker influence on utility of 
the resolution time.  It has nothing to do with the so-called certainty effect meaning an 
“overweighting” of the worst outcome as occurs in prospect theory and other rank 
dependent  generalisations  of  expected  utility  theory.    This  entire  class  of  non-
expected utility theories are epistemically atemporal and thus lack reference to the 
resolution time ! and limit property (III).
1  
In section 6 it will be shown that a utility function u(p0,!) which satisfies the modified 
expectation property (I') cannot satisfy the limit property (III)  unless u(p0, !) does not 
depend  on  !.  However,  dependency  on  ! i s  t h e  phenomenon  that  needs  to  be 
explained. Obviously either (I') or the limit property (III) has to be dropped since it is 
implausible, even absurd, to propose that a business person’s profits and emotional 
well-being can be independent of ! except in the neighbourhood of the limit of the 
distribution p0(x) being degenerate.  We think that the modified expectation property 
has to be abolished in favour of limit property (III).  The generalised von Neumann-
Morgenstern  utility  of  Kreps  and  Porteus,  restricted  to  the  temporal  lotteries 
considered here, has the modified expectation property and therefore cannot depend 
on the resolution time ! without violating the limit property (III).  In our view this is a 
serious objection against the axiomatic theory of Kreps and Porteus.  
An  important  distinction  between  primary  and  secondary  satisfactions  and 
dissatisfactions contributing to the evaluation of choices is discussed in section 8. For 
some classes of emotional satisfactions, this distinction dates back at least to Marshall 
(1921) Canaan (1926) and Ramsey (1926).  For the gamut of emotional and financial 
(material) satisfactions, the distinction is delineated in Pope (1983).  The distinction is 
used  to  partition  all  satisfactions,  to  define  the  utility  of  gambling  and  solve  the 
                                                 
1  For what Savage meant by liking certainty, and its contrast to what Allais and others constructing 
rank dependent theories today term a certainty effect, see Appendix 1. Pope Selten Risk and EUT    11:37 AM, Saturday, 28 November 2009  6 
complementarity  paradox  whose  solution  von  Neumann  and  Morgenstern  left  to 
future researchers, Pope (1984, 1985 and 1995).  The distinction is given the new 
terminology of primary and secondary satisfactions in Pope (2001).  This paper lists 
words  that  had  evolved  over  the  preceding  century  for  parts  for  each  sort  of 
satisfaction  and  describes  the  confusions  associated.    The  terminology  for  the 
overarching  theory  involving  the  distinction  between  primary  and  secondary 
satisfactions is changed from that of Pope (1983) to being termed SKAT, the Stages 
of Knowledge Ahead Theory in (Pope, Leitner and Leopold 2006).  
Primary satisfactions or dissatisfactions derive from a particular outcome x, regardless 
of the probability of this outcome x. In our simple example of a business opportunity 
at t = 0, the gain W and the loss L are sources of primary satisfactions connected to the 
outcomes,  winning  or  losing.  The  anticipated  planning  advantages  of  an  early 
resolution  time  are  secondary  satisfactions.  Another  example  of  a  secondary 
satisfaction is the hope of winning a big amount after buying a relatively cheap lottery 
ticket.  
Caplin and Leahy (2001) have presented an interesting two period model. In this 
model  utility  depends  only  on  the  ‘emotional  states’  for  the  two  periods.  A 
‘generating function’ describes how the emotional state of a period depends on the 
physical features of an outcome in the current period and in the case of the first 
period, also on the distribution of emotional states in the second period. A simplified 
version of this model is presented in section 9.  
Section 10 contains critical remarks on the model of Caplin and Leahy. These remarks 
concern not only our simplified version but also the original model. In particular the 
description of the decision process of Caplin and Leahy (2001) is contrasted with that 
of SKAT. It is argued that SKAT offers a more adequate picture. However, we think 
that Caplin and Leahy (2001) is an interesting attempt to portray decision making as a 
two layer process composed of an automatic emergence of emotional states and the 
maximization of expected utility depending on the distribution of pairs of emotional 
states for the two periods. 
Caplin  and  Leahy  justify  expected  utility  maximization  and  timewise  additively 
separable utilities by an axiom system of Fishburn (1982). One of the axioms in this 
system is the substitution axiom. Our critique of the interpretation of this axiom in 
section  7  applies  here  too.  Another  axiom  in  the  same  system  is  their  ‘marginal 
distribution  axiom’  that  postulates  that  the  preference  relationship  between  two 
distributions of pairs of emotional states depends only on their marginal distributions 
with respect to these emotional states.  Appendix 5 shows that the following assertion Pope Selten Risk and EUT    11:37 AM, Saturday, 28 November 2009  7 
holds. Assume that the expectation property (I) holds for the utility of distributions 
over pairs of emotional states and that the marginal distribution axiom holds for the 
preference relationship represented by this utility function. Then this utility function 
is timewise additively separable. In addition to this statement it is also pointed out that 
in view of its interpretation the marginal distribution axiom is by no means obvious.  
This has been explained already in Fishburn (1982). 
The  simple  temporal  framework  requires  many  concepts  additional  to  those  of 
standard expected utility theory and its epistemically atemporal generalisations such 
as anticipated utility theory, the general theory of random choices, Allais (1988) and 
prospect theory, Tversky and Kahneman (1992).  To aid in recalling the notation for 
the new concepts, Appendix 2 gives an alphabetised list of the notation giving the 
name of each concept, and where useful a brief definition or description.   
 
 
2. Basic notions of the simple temporal framework 
The simple temporal framework considers only a narrow class of temporal lotteries 
namely choices of the form (p0, !) where p0 is a probability distribution over the 
outcomes at the point of choice time point t = 0 and ! is the resolution time point.  
However this class is wide enough to discuss the basic issues raised in this paper.  
We proceed from the assumption of a finite outcome set, X, interpreted as the set of 
all  conceivable  outcomes.  In  order  to  keep  things  simple,  time  is  modelled  as  a 
sequence of finitely many points. These are T+1 points of time, 0, … T combined 
with T periods of time 1, … , T.  Time period t begins at the time point t–1 and covers 
all later times before the time point t.  The time point t does not belong to period t but 
to the following period t+1. The last time point T does not belong to any period.  
Consider  a  probability  distribution  p  over  X.    The  notation  p(x)  is  used  for  the 
probability of an outcome x " X.   
Outcomes are interpreted as what the decision maker anticipates as possible future 
events that will affect her utility.  Outcomes have a time structure.  An outcome x is a 
sequence of segments s1, …, st, … sT for periods 1, …, t, … , T respectively.  These 
segments st are elements of a finite segment set S. A segment is interpreted as a 
description  of  what,  in  reaching  her  choice,  the  decision  maker  anticipates  might 
happen in a period.  The set X of conceivable outcomes may or may not contain all 
sequences with T members that can be formed with elements of S.  The scope to 
exclude some sequences allows for irreversibilities like death, after which a person 
cannot become alive again.  Consider an outcome x with the segment sequence s1, … 
sT.  The subsequence s1, … s#  is called the part of x before #.  We further make the 
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theories,  that  from  the  point  of  choice,  as  the  future  unfolds,  the  decision  maker 
knows in each period t that segment st and derives utility from it.  
The time point t = 0 is the point of choice.  At this time point the decision maker has 
to  take  a  choice  available  to  her.  Before  she  does  this  she  has  two  items  of 
information  about  every  available  choice.    One  item  is  an  initial  probability 
distribution p0 over X.  The other one is the resolution time !, one of the numbers 0, 
… , T-1.  The resolution time is defined as the first of these time points 0, … , T-1 at 
which the decision maker knows which outcome is realized.  
It is assumed that at the beginning of period t, i.e. at the time point t-1, the decision 
maker sees the segment of period t lying before her.  At the time point T-1 she sees 
the last segment and the earlier segments are in the past.  Therefore T-1 is the latest 
possible resolution time point.  
The probability distribution of the decision maker evolves over time by Bayesian 
updating.  For t = 0, … T-1.  A probability distribution pt over X is degenerate at time 
point t if it assigns p(x) = 1 to a particular outcome x " X and p(y) = 0 to every 
outcome y " X with y " x. Probability distributions over X without this property are 
called  non-degenerate.      In  this  paper’s  simple  temporal  framework  the  decision 
maker knows that choices which are degenerate at the time of choice t = 0 will remain 
degenerate, and that any non-degenerate probabilities will evolve over time to become 
degenerate.    It  is  useful  to  have  a  distinct  symbol  for  a  distribution  when  it  is 
degenerate as follows.  For every x " X, let ex be the probability distribution with 
ex(x) = 1 and ey(y) = 0 for every y " X with y " x.  Every degenerate probability 
distribution is one of the distributions ex.  A choice c is called sure if p0 is degenerate 
and risky if p0 is non-degenerate.  Here the word ‘risky’ means that the decision 
maker perceives a risk connected with the choice.  Whether she perceives such a risk 
depends on her beliefs. It is hardly imaginable that a decision maker with reasonable 
beliefs perceives a risk connected to a sure choice.  
There is a subtle difference between probability zero and impossibility.  Consider, for 
example,  a  random  variable $  that  is  uniformly  distributed  over  the  closed  unit 
interval [0,1].  A particular value, say .3, has probability 0 under this distribution in 
spite of the fact that one value must be realised.  Even in distributions over finite sets, 
elements with probability zero may nevertheless be possible.  Thus an outcome z may 
only occur if the value .3 of $ is realised.  However, in the case of distributions over 
finite sets, a distribution can have the property that an event with probability zero is 
impossible.  For the sake of simplicity we assume that all probability distributions Pope Selten Risk and EUT    11:37 AM, Saturday, 28 November 2009  9 
over  X  considered  in  this  paper  are  of  this  kind.    In  this  way  one  avoids  the 
cumbersome distinction between absolute certainty and knowledge with probability 1.  
For  t  =  0,  …  ,  T-1,  let  pt  be  the  probability  distribution  at  time  t.    The  initial 
probability distribution p0, together with the resolution time !, completely determines 
which  sequences  p0,  …  pT-1  of  the  decision  maker’s  probability  distributions  can 
evolve over time and with which probabilities they can occur.  The segment observed 
at the beginning of a period may lead to an updating. An updating must occur at the 
resolution time !.  There the decision maker receives the information about the exact 
outcome realised.  If ! is one of the numbers 1, … , T-1, then at this point of time ! 
the probability distribution p#-1 changes to ex with probability p0(x).  The probability 
distribution p# is a random variable just like the outcome x. 
The sequences p0, … , pT-1 for which p0 and ! determine positive probabilities are 
called sequences generated by the pair (p0, !).  Since a pair (p0, !) contains all the 
information necessary for the determination of the consequences of a choice, a choice 
can be defined as a pair of this kind with some additional properties.  
It will be required that pt changes at most once.  If p0 is non-degenerate and ! is not 
zero, then the definition of the earliest resolution time (as the earliest point of time at 
which the exact outcome is known to the decision maker) has the consequence that 
there must be a change of pt from p!-1 to p!. This is the only change permitted in a 
sequence p0, … , pT-1 generated by a choice in the simple  decision framework. This is 
expressed by the following definition. 
Definition of a choice in the simple temporal framework  
A choice c is a pair (p0, !), namely an initial probability distribution p0 
over X together with a resolution time ! where ! is one of the numbers 0, 
… , T-1 such that the following is true for every sequence, p0 … ,  pT-1 
generated by (p0, !).  A change of pt takes place in the step from p!-1 to p! if 




The set of all conceivable choices defined above is the choice set C.  A 
decision situation D is a finite subset of C with at least two elements.  
The choices in D are called available in this decision situation.  A utility 
function assigns a real number, the utility u(p0, !) to every choice (p0, !) 
" C.  
The decision maker is assumed to have a utility function. If she faces a decision 
situation D, she will choose an available choice with maximal utility. 
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3. Consequences of the choice definition  
In this section we examine which pairs (p0, !) satisfy the choice definition of the 
preceding section. We first look at the case where p0 is degenerate, since the decision 
maker knows the realized outcome already at the point of choice t = 0.  It follows that 
every sure choice must have the form (ex, 0) and that for every risky choice (p0, !) the 
resolution time ! is positive.  By the definition of a risky choice p0 is non-degenerate. 
We have obtained the following conclusion.  
Conclusion (i)  
Every sure choice has the form (ex, 0) with x " X.  For every risky choice 
(p0, !) the resolution time ! is positive and p0 is non-degenerate. 
Consider a pair of the form (ex, 0).  Since the initial probability distribution p0 = ex is 
already degenerate, it cannot be changed by updating.  We must have pt = ex for t = 0,  
… , T-1.  Therefore a pair (ex, 0) is a choice in the sense of the definition of the 
preceding  section.    This  together  with  conclusion  (i)  leads  to  the  following 
conclusion. 
Conclusion (ii)  
A pair (p0, !) is a sure choice if and only if it has the form (ex, 0). 
Assume that the pair (p0, !) is a non-degenerate probability distribution p0 over X with 
a positive resolution time.  We know by conclusion (i) that a pair denoting a risky 
choice must have these properties.  However not every pair of this kind is a choice in 
the sense of the definition of the preceding section. 
Following  Pope  (1983)  we  argue  that  under  our  assumptions,  in  addition  to  the 
properties mentioned in conclusion (i), a risky choice c = (p0, !) must satisfy the 
condition that every outcome x " X has the same part before !, a part that we term the 
pre-resolution part of the choice c.  Let x and y be two outcomes with p0(x) > 0 and 
p0(y) > 0 and different parts before !.  Then there must be a smallest positive number 
h such that the h
th segment of x and y is different.  Let h be this number.  Then the 
decision maker observes the segment h with h # ! at the point h-1.  If this happens, 
she can exclude x or y and therefore has to update her probability distribution at the 
time point h-1.  The definition of a choice of the preceding section does not permit 
this.  We have obtained the following conclusion. 
Conclusion (iii)  
If a pair (p0, !) is a risky choice then all outcomes x " X with p0(x) > 0 must 
have the same part before !, the pre-resolution part of the choice (p0, !). 
Let (p0, !) be a pair with the following three properties: 1) the initial probability 
distribution p0 is non-degenerate; 2) the resolution time ! is one of the numbers 1, … 
T-1; and 3) all outcomes x with p0(x) > 0 have the same pre-resolution part.   Pope Selten Risk and EUT    11:37 AM, Saturday, 28 November 2009  11 
We know already that a risky choice must have the properties 1) and 2) by conclusion 
(i) and property 3) by conclusion (iii).  We shall now show that the three properties of 
(p0, !) have the consequence that (p0, !,) is a choice c in the sense of the definition of 
the preceding section. 
In view of conclusion (iii), the initial probability distribution is not updated before the 
time point !. The decision maker knows already before he takes the choice that the 
part  before  !  common  to  all  outcomes  x  with  p0(x)  >  0  is  guaranteed  to  occur.  
Nothing further can be learned from the fact that the decision maker observes these 
segments as they occur period by period after the point of choice, time point t = 0.  
Therefore we have pt = p0 for t = 0, … , !-1.  However, p! is degenerate.  Consequently 
pt  changes  in  the  step  from  p!-1  to  p#  from  a  non-degenerate  to  a  degenerate 
distribution. A degenerate distribution cannot be updated any more.  Therefore we 
have pt = p! for t = !, … , T-1.  Consequently (p0, !) satisfies the requirement of the 
choice definition at the end of the preceding section.  We can conclude that a pair (p0, 
!) is a risky choice if and only if it has the properties 1), 2) and 3).  The following 
result summarizes what has been shown up to now and gives a complete overview of 
all choices in the sense of definition at the end of the preceding section. 
Results about choices in the simple temporal framework 
The set of all “sure” choices is the set of all pairs (ex, 0).  The set of all risky 
choices is the set of all pairs (p0, !) with the following three properties:  
1)  the initial probability distribution p0 is non-degenerate;  
2)  the resolution time ! is one of the numbers 1, … , T-1; and 
3)  all outcomes x " X with p0(x) > 0 have the same part before !. 
 
 
4. Remarks on standard expected utility 
Standard expected utility theory, from now on abbreviated to EUT, lacks reference to 
the change in knowledge ahead inherent in the resolution time ! being positive at the 
point of choice.  It is one of the aims of this paper to show that EUT cannot be applied 
to this paper’s simple temporal framework, at least not in a satisfactory way.  There 
are many axiomatizations of EUT.  However, here we are not concerned with axioms 
but rather with conclusions.  We will restrict our attention to the case of finitely many 
possible outcomes. 
In EUT, we can use simpler notation.  We can omit the subscript 0 to indicate that p is 
the distribution at the point of choice t = 0 and not at a later date, since EUT ignores 
the issue of when the time point ! occurs when any risk will be resolved.  In this 
section therefore and in Appendix 4 we use the symbols x, X, p, c, C and D with 
analogous  but  different  meanings  from  those  of  sections  1  to  3.    The  set  of  all 
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is simply a probability distribution p over the outcome set X.  The probability of an 
outcome x " X under p is denoted by p(x). The symbol C stands for the set of all 
conceivable choices. A decision problem D is a finite non-empty subset of C.  This 
analogous but simpler set of concepts and associated notation (that are enabled under 
the restrictive assumptions of EUT and its epistemically atemporal rank dependent 
generalisations) are used only in section 4 and Appendix 4. 
The decision maker is assumed to have a complete preference order   over C. The 
expression  p    q  means  that  the  decision  maker  prefers  p t o  q   or  is  indifferent 
between p and q.  Strict preference of p to q is expressed by p   q.  A utility function u 
is a function which assigns a real number u(p) to every p " C.  We say that a utility 
function u represents the preference order   if the following is true: u(p) % u(q) holds 
if and only if we have p   q. A utility function v is a positive linear transformation of 
a utility function u, if there are real numbers a and b with a > 0 and  
   v(p) = a u(p) + b     for every p " C 
For every x " X let ex be the probability distribution of X that assigns 1 to x and 0 to 
every  other  outcome  in  X.    The  distribution  ex  is  the  sure  choice  of  x.    Strictly 
speaking ex, 0 is an element of C, but x itself does not belong to C.   
However, as explained in Pope (1983) and (2004), to avoid introducing additional 
inconsistencies, in EUT the utilities of outcomes must be interpreted in one of two 
ways, that of Ramsey (1926), or that of Friedman and Savage (1948).  See Appendix 
1 for more details.  The upshot is that it is not necessary to distinguish between ex and 
x in EUT.  However this identification is problematic since it hides severe restrictions 
in the interpretation of EUT and it its axiomatizations. 
The  axioms  in  many  EUT  axiomatizations  are  requirements  imposed  on  the 
preference order  .  In others the axioms are in terms of utilities – eg von Neumann 
and Morgenstern (1944) or in terms of the outcomes, eg Marschak (1950).  However a 
translation to the language of preferences is feasible in view of the lack of necessity to 
distinguish between ex and x in EUT.  In the following it will be assumed that the 
axioms express postulated properties of the preference order.  Most axiomatizations of 
this kind lead to a representation theorem of the following form. 
 
If the axioms are satisfied then the following two assertions (I) 
and (II) hold. 
(I)  Expectation property 
The preference order   can be represented by a utility function u 
of the following form, 
      u(p) = 
! 
x"X
# p(x) u(x) 
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(II) Essential uniqueness property 
If two utility functions u and v represent the same preference 
order   then one is a positive linear transformation of the other.    
A positive linear transformation of a utility function shifts the zero point and the unit 
of  measurement  like  the  transition  from  Fahrenheit  to  Celsius.  Obviously  the 
difference between the two temperature scales is not essential. In this sense a utility 
function u with the expectation property (I) is essentially unique if it also satisfies (II). 
It can be seen without difficulty that a positive linear transformation v of a utility 
function u with the expected value property also has this property.  As has been said 
before, this paper is restricted to the case of finitely many possible outcomes. For this 
case  it  is  relatively  easy  to  show  that  (I)  implies  (II).    A  proof  will  be  given  in 
Appendix  4.    Nevertheless  it  is  important  to  keep  in  mind  that  a  representation 
theorem has the two parts, (I) and (II).  As we shall see in section 5, in the context of 
the simple temporal framework a utility function may not be essentially unique even 
if it has a modified expectation property, analogous to property (I). 
 
5. Expected utility in the simple temporal framework. 
From now on we revert to the simple temporal framework and thus to the denotation 
of x, X, p, c, C and D as defined in section 2 and summarised in Table A2.1 of 
Appendix 2.  As we have seen in section 2 from conclusions (i) and (ii), in the simple 
temporal framework, choosing (p0, !) is making a sure choice if and only if ! = 0.  
Otherwise it is making a risky choice.  In this framework a utility function u can have 
the expectation property provided that u(p0, !) does not depend on ! such that instead 
of u(p0, !) we can write: 
    u(p0, !) = u(p0)         for every choice (p0, !). 
The expectation property also implies the conditions under which an outcome x can 
be identified with the distribution ex 
Suppose  that  the  decision  maker  does  not  care  about  the  resolution  time  !  and 
evaluates outcomes as if certain so that we can omit the subscript 0 to indicate that 
distributions  p,  q  and r  are  at  the  point  of  choice  t  =  0  and  not  at  a  later  date.  
However, even if this is the case, there is still an important difference between EUT 
and the simple temporal framework.  This difference concerns the definition of a 
choice. 
In EUT a choice is simply a probability distribution over X.  Let p, q and r be three 
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r(x) = $p(x) + (1-$)q(x)          for all x " X.    
Here $ is a real number with 0 # $ # 1. If p, q and r can be related in this way, and 
simplifying  our  notation  to  the  EUT  convention  –  wherein  all  probabilities  are 
recorded solely with their values at the time of choice – the subscript 0 can be left 
implicit, 
    r = $p + (1-$)q 
and we say that r is a “mixture” of p and q.  If we have 0 < $ < 1 then r is called a 
proper mixture of p and q.  In EUT every proper mixture of two choices is again a 
choice or in other words, the set C of all choices is convex.   
By contrast, the choice set in this paper’s simple temporal framework does not have a 
similar convexity property. Suppose that (p0, !) and (q0, !) are risky choices with 
different pre-resolution parts, ie with different outcome segments prior to !, the time 
point when the risk concerning the last outcome segment is resolved.  Let r0 be a 
proper mixture of p0 and q0.  Then the conceivable choice (r0, !) satisfies conclusions 
(i)  and  (ii)  of  the  simple  temporal  framework  identified  in  section  2,  but  not 
conclusion (iii). Consequently (r0, !) fails to be a choice. This is the reason why a 
utility function u(p0, !) defined on the set of all conceivable choices C in the simple 
temporal  framework  may  have  the  expectation  property,  but  nevertheless  not  be 
essentially unique.  This will now be illustrated by an extremely simple example.    
Example 1. The time horizon is T = 3.  The set of segments is S = {a, d}. The symbol 
a stands for “alive” and d means “dead”.  Somebody who dies in period t cannot 
become alive later.  Death will happen for sure in period 3, if it does not happen 
earlier.  Accordingly there are only three possible outcomes: 
x1 = (a, a, d) 
x2 = (a, d, d) 
x3  = (d, d, d)  
Here the outcomes are described by vectors with the j
th segment as the j
th part (j = 1, 2, 
3).  For i = 1, 2, 3, let ei be the probability distribution which assigns 1 to xi and zero 
to each of the two other outcomes. 
In our example a risky choice must have the form (p0, 1).  At ! = 2 no uncertainty is 
left.  Conclusion (ii) in section 2 restricts the probability distribution p0 in (p0, 1) to a 
proper mixture of e1 and e2.  Otherwise the outcomes with positive probability under 
p0 would lack a common pre-resolution part.  Table 1 provides a complete overview 
over all possible choices. 
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Table 1: The Choice set C for Example 1 
Sure Choices  Risky Choices 
c1 = (e1, 0) 
c2 = (e2, 0) 
c3 = (e3, 0) 
c = (p0, 1)  
with 
p0(xi) > 0 for i =1, 2  
and 
p0(x3) = 0 
 
Given that “a” is alive and  “d” is dead, the following suggests itself. 
(P1) Preference order assumption in example 1 
Let (p0, 1) and (q0, 1) be risky choices with p0(x1) > q0(x1).  
Then following is true: 
(e1, 0)   (p0, 1)   (q0, 1)   (e2, 0)   (e3, 0) 
 
Assumption  (P1)  completely  describes  the  preference  order  .    All  preference 
relations between two different choices are strict.  From Table 1 it can be seen that the 
resolution time in a choice (p0, !) " C is uniquely determined by p0.  Therefore a 
utility function defined on C has the property that the utility of a choice (p0, !) " C 
can be described as a function of p0 alone, as u(p0).  Starting from three fixed but 
arbitrary real numbers u1, u2 and u3 with 
    u1 > u2 > u3 
we  now  construct  such  a  utility  function  u(p0)  which  represents    and  has  the 
expectation property (I).  Define    
u(ei) = ui   for i = 1, 2, 3 
and 
u(p0) = p0(x1)u1 + p0(x2)u2   
for  
p0 = "e1 + (1-")e2     with     0 < " < 1 
It can be seen without difficulty that u(p0) represents the preference order   defined 







p0(xi) u(xi)      for all (p0, !) " C 
This shows that u(p0) has the expectation property (I).   
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We  now  show  that  u(p0)  is  not  essentially  unique.  Let  v  be  a  positive  linear 
transformation of u. 
    v(p0) = au(p0) + b   
Define, 
vi = v(ei) 
We have 










The ratio of the two utility differences u1 – u2 and u2 – u3 is not changed by a positive 
linear transformation. However, in the same way as u has been constructed we can 
construct a utility function w starting from real numbers w1, w2 and w3 with  
    w1 > w2 > w3 










This utility function w cannot be a positive linear transformation of u. Therefore u 
does not satisfy the essential uniqueness property (II). 
The lack of the essential uniqueness in utility functions with the expectation property 
is due to the fact that only relatively few of the probability distributions p over the 
outcome set X are parts of choices (p0, !) " C.  
This is the reason why Proposition 1 in Appendix 4 does not hold for the simple 
temporal framework.  In the case of example 1, the proof of Appendix 4’s Proposition 
1 would require a choice (p0, !) such that p is a proper mixture of e1 and e3 for which 
the decision maker is indifferent to e2.  There is no such choice in example 1. 
 
6. Resolution time dependence 
It is a highly unrealistic assumption that preferences do not depend on resolution 
times.  Many people would like to know as soon as possible whether they have passed 
an exam.  However early resolution of risk is not always preferred.  Many people 
would not like to know the exact day of their death years in advance.  Suppose that 
somebody belongs to a family in which there have been cases of a deadly hereditary 
disease. Whether she will get the disease ten years from now depends on whether she 
has a certain genetic disposition.  This can be found out by a gene test.  Would she 
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to take it even if money is paid to her for taking it?  Presumably most people would 
not be indifferent between an early or late resolution of the risk in this situation. 
If resolution times matter, utility cannot depend on the outcome alone.  In the simple 
temporal framework one may want to pursue an approach which looks at a pair (x, !) 
with x " X and ! = 0, … , T-1 as the basic unit to which a utility z(x, !) is attached. 
One can then postulate a utility function u defined on the set C of all choices in the 
simple temporal framework such that u has the following property. 
(I')  Modified expectation property 
For every choice (p0, !) " C we have  
u(p0, !) =  p(x)z(x, !) 
  x " X    
where z is a function defined on the set of all pairs (x, !) 
with x " X and ! = 0, ... T-1 
 
It must be emphasized that for ! = 1, … , T-1 the pair (ex, !) is not a choice but a 
pseudo choice. If x is reached with probability 1 then the resolution time ! must be 
zero.  Therefore z(x, !) should not be interpreted as the utility of a choice but as a limit 
of choice utilities.  Consider an arbitrary choice (p0, !) and an outcome x with p0(x) > 
0. Define 
q& = (1 - &) ex + & p0        for 0 < & <1.  
Obviously (q&, !) is a choice.  This implies that we have 
z(x, !) =  lim u(q&, !)     if   (I')   holds. 
&'0   
It is a basic property of expected utility that it depends linearly on the probabilities of 
the outcomes wherever it is defined.  If this is the case then the limit of u(q&, !) for 
&'0  exists  and  is  independent  of  p0.    The  representation  required  by  (I')  is  then 
possible. Obviously the modified expectation property is the only natural adaptation 
of the expected utility property (I) to the simple temporal framework. 
The modified expectation property permits a dependence of u(p0, !) on the resolution 
time ! and on the common pre-resolution part of the outcomes x with p0(x) > 0 in the 
choice (p0, !).  Nevertheless we shall now argue that the modified expectation property 
is not really satisfactory.   
Consider again the choices of the form q& = (1-&) ex + &p0 with 0 < & < 1 where (p0, !) 
is an arbitrary choice. As & approaches zero, the risk involved in q & becomes smaller 
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sure choice (ex, 0) and (q&, !) with a very small &, say & = 10
-100.  It is reasonable to 
assume that the difference does not matter in the limit and that therefore the limit of 
u(q&, !) for &   0 is equal to u(ex, 0).  This leads to the following limit property for a 
utility function u(p0, !) defined on the set C of all conceivable choices (p0, !) in the 
simple temporal framework.  
(III) Limit property 
Let (p0, !) be a risky choice in C and let x be an outcome 
with p0(x) > 0. Then for  
   q& = (1-&)ex + &p0   with   0 < & <1  
the following equation  
lim u(q&, !) = u(ex, 0) 
      &'0   
holds.    This  is  true  for  every  choice  (p0,  !)  and  every 
outcome x with p0(x) >0. 
Consider a utility function u which satisfies (I') and (III).  Then it follows by limit 
property (III) that we have  
    u(x, !) = z(ex, 0)     for ! = 0, … , T-1 
Consequently the modified expectation property yields 
u(p0, !) =  p0(x) z(x, 0) 
   x " X    
This means that such a utility function does not depend on the resolution time but 
only on the probability distribution p0.  If we write u(p0) instead of u(p0, !) and u(x) 
instead of z(x, 0) we obtain the expectation property (I). 
The modified expectation property is an attempt to save as much as possible from the 
expectation property.  The limit property (III), however, has a strong intuitive appeal.  
As has been argued at the beginning of this section, resolution times matter in serious 
decision problems. If one wants to model resolution time dependent utility one cannot 
have both (I') and (III).  In our view (I') should be dropped in favour of (III). 
We do not want to suggest a functional form of a utility function defined on the set C 
of all conceivable choices (p0, !).  Instead of this we propose identifying the causes of 
satisfactions and dissatisfactions in every concrete application context and making 
them explicit in the modelling of the utility function u(p, !).  Preferences for and 
against an early resolution of risk may be motivated by curiosity, hope, or fear or even 
the fear of losing the hope.  Emotional factors of this kind are important for the 
wellbeing of the decision maker, Bell (1981).  Moreover in suitable dosages, such 
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too  little  fear  and  regret  in  contemplating  risky  choices,  for  instance,  undertake 
foolhardy choices, Damasio (1994) and Camille et al (2004).  Those taking choices 
yielding too little in the way of thrills and hope for the brain’s needed stimulation 
often compensate with other choices that involve socially and personally destructive 
behaviour  such  as  juvenile  delinquency  and  excessive  social  gambling,  Scitovsky 
(1976), 1981, Pope (2001) and Pope forthcoming.  Since they affect utility in the 
current choice, and the appropriateness of future choice, emotions should enter the 
utility evaluation of each choice.  In this respect SKAT, the Stages of Knowledge 
Ahead Theory (Pope, Leitner and Leopold 2006) can be useful as a modelling guide. 
The following result states the most important conclusion of this section. 
Result: 
Let u(p0, !) be a utility function defined for all (p0, !) " C and 
assume that u has the modified expectation property (I') and 
the limit property (III).  Then u(p0, !) neither depends on !, 
nor on the pre-resolution part of the outcomes with p0(x) > 0, 
and u(p0, !) is a function of p0 alone. 
 
7. Critique of the substitution axiom 
In  their  pioneering  Econometrica  paper,  Kreps  and  Porteus  (1978)  developed  a 
decision  theoretic  approach  in  which  resolution  times  of  probabilities  have  an 
important role. Other authors like Klibanoff and Ozdenoren (2006) have built on their 
work.  We also appreciate Kreps and Porteus, even if we present a different point of 
view. 
As has been shown, the modified expectation property together with the limit property 
exclude  preferences  depending  on  the  resolution  time.  Nevertheless  in  their 
Econometrica paper (1978) Kreps and Porteus axiomatize utility functions that may 
depend on the resolution time.  The restrictions of these utility functions to the simple 
temporal  framework  satisfy  the  modified  expectation  property.    As  we  have  seen 
these restrictions cannot satisfy the limit property unless they do not depend on the 
resolution time and also not on the common pre-resolution part of all outcomes with 
positive probability in the probability distribution of the choice. 
If the limit property holds for a utility function u(p0, !) defined on the set C of all 
choices in the simple temporal framework and u(p0, !) depends on the resolution time 
!, then the modified expectation property must be violated. We may express this by 
saying that the modified expectation property, resolution time dependence and the 
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In  the  theory  of  Kreps  and  Porteus,  the  modified  expectation  property  is  a 
consequence  of  axioms  4.1,  4.2  and  4.3  (p195).    Axiom  4.1  requires  that  the 
preference  order  over  temporal  lotteries  be  complete  and  transitive.    Axiom  4.2 
postulates continuity of the preference order.  These two axioms are standard.  We do 
not want to criticize them in this paper.  The crucial axiom is the substitution axiom 
4.3.  In the language of our simple temporal framework, this axiom can be expressed 
as follows: 
Substitution axiom: 
Let (p, !) and (p!, !) be two choices with the property that all outcomes x 
with p(x) > 0 or p!(x) > 0 have the same pre-resolution part. Assume 
    (p, !)   (p!, !) 
Moreover for some ß with 0 < ß < 1. Let p" be probability distribution 
    p" = ßp + (1- ß)p! 
Then, 
    (p", !)   (p!, !) 
holds. 
Interpretation of the substitution axiom  
Whether an axiom is plausible or not depends on the interpretation of the formal terms 
appearing  in  it.  In  the  substitution  axiom  p"  is  defined  as  ßp  +  (1-ß)p!.    An 
interpretation of ß and 1-ß as probabilities in a two-stage lottery suggests itself.  In a 
first stage two events, say Y and Z come about with probabilities, ß and (1-ß) and then 
in the second stage (p, !) follows in the case of Y and (p!, !) in the case of Z.  However 
this interpretation does not seem to be adequate in the framework of a theory in which 
every probability is connected to a resolution time.  What is the resolution time of ß?  
Suppose that !1 is the resolution time of ß. Since the first stage of the two-stage lottery 
precedes the second one, we must have !1 < !.  The substitution axiom, however, 
mentions only one resolution time, namely !.  For a two-stage lottery, the resolution 
time !1 of ß and (1-ß) must precede the resolution time ! of (p, !) and (p!, !).  We must 
have !1 < !.  As observed in Pope (2006), this precludes ß and 1- ß being interpreted 
as probabilities: ß and 1- ß are simply coefficients in a convex linear combination of p 
and p!.  See Appendix 3. 
Let X!(s1, … , s!–1) be the set of all outcomes with the same part s1, … , s!–1 before !. 
Moreover  let  P!(s1,  … , s#–1)  be  the  set  of  all  probability  distributions  over  
X!(s1, … , s!-1)).  The set P!(s1, … , s#–1) is convex, in the sense that every convex linear 
combination of probability distributions in this space is also in this space.  Under the 
conditions specified for p and p! by the substitution axiom, (p", !) is therefore always 
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in  P!(s1,  …  ,  s!–1)  does  not  provide  a  justification  of  the  mathematical  operation  of 
forming a convex linear combination of p and p! implying the preference relation of 
the substitution axiom. 
Consider a preference order over a convex set of consumption bundles. In this case 
convex  linear  combinations  are  also  in  the  set.    An  axiom  analogous  to  the 
substitution  axiom  combined  with  transitivity  and  continuity  would  yield  the 
conclusion that indifference curves must be linear, contrary to the usual assumptions 
of consumption theory that a rational decision maker can have non-linear indifference 
curves. 
An  intuitive  justification  of  the  substitution  axiom  would  require  a  substantive 
interpretation of the weights ß and 1-ß in the definition of p". Moreover as noted 
above, this interpretation cannot be based on the idea that ß and 1-ß are probabilities 
of having the choices of respectively (p, !) and (p!, !), since no resolution time is 
attached to them. 
Unlike the substitution axiom, the limit property has a strong intuitive appeal. Since 
the substitution axiom, together with completeness, transitivity and continuity, leads 
to the modified expectation property, our objections against the modified expectation 
theory  also  apply  to  the  substitution  axiom.    There  is  a  conflict  between  the 
substitution  axiom  and  the  limit  property  if  one  wants  to  model  resolution  time 
dependent utility.  In our view one cannot uphold the substitution axiom. 
It is however also important to understand what is not intuitively compelling in the 
substitution axiom given that the interpretation of its mixture ß and 1-ß is restricted to 
being  a  convex  linear  combination  of  p  and  p!.    For  this  purpose  we  present  an 
example.  Note  that  in  this  example  we  avoid  impossible  sequences  in  a  set  of 
segments as in example 1 (from being dead in period 1 to being alive in period 2) 
because  the  distributions  lacked  a  common  pre-resolution  part.    The  substitution 
axiom is confined to distributions with a common pre-resolution part.  Nevertheless as 
example 2 below shows, one cannot uphold the substitution axiom as a pre-requisite 
for reasonable choice. 
Example 2: Suppose that after an examination a patient is told that he has a very rare 
nerve disease.  There is a chance of 90% for either blindness or a complete loss of 
balance after 50 months.  Both developments of the disease have the same probability, 
45%.  With a probability of 10% nothing bad happens. It will be known after 46 
months, but not earlier, which of the three possibilities will be realized. 
There is a treatment available that eliminates the danger of a loss of balance but also 
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disagreeable.  The cost is carried by the health insurance.  It will be known after 46 
months whether the patient will become blind after 50 months.  The health status in 
the first 50 months is the same regardless of whether the patient takes the treatment or 
not.  The patient has to decide for or against the treatment.  He has no other choices. 
The decision problem permits three outcomes x1, x2 and x3 
  x1  blindness 
  x2  complete loss of balance 
  x3  no adverse effects 
All 3 outcomes have the same resolution time and the same part (the same set of 
segments) before the resolution time.  The names listed above refer to what happens 
in the last outcome segment.  We shall look at the probability distribution p over these 
three outcomes as a vector p = (p1, p2, p3) with the probabilities pi of the xi as parts.  
Define 
p = (.9, 0, .1) 








2p!= (.45, .45, .1) 
The length of one period is assumed to be one month.  The resolution time of both 
choices of the patient is ! = 47, the point of time at which period 46 has just ended. 
Let c1 be the choice of taking the treatment and c2 be the choice of not taking it. 
Moreover let c0 be the unavailable choice (p, 47): 
   c0 = (p, 47),   c1 = (p!,47)   and   c2 = (p", 47) 
The decision situation is portrayed in Table 2. 
 
Table 2: The Decision Situation of Example 2 
  Outcomes  
named by what happens in the last outcome 
segment – all have the same set of segments 
prior to the resolution time ! = 47 





 No Adverse 
Effects 
x3  
c0 = (p, 47) not available  .9  .0  .1 
c1 = (p!, 47) available  .0  .9  .1 
c2 = (p", 47) available   .45  .45  .1 
Note: the entries in the field are the probabilities of outcomes (column) following a choice (row) 
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Suppose that the patient would prefer (p, 47) to (p!, 47) as assumed by the substitution 
axiom.  This means that he would prefer a 90% probability of a complete loss of 
balance to a 90% probability of blindness if in both cases with 10% probability there 
are no bad effects.  Although (p, 47) is not available as a choice, p"#mixes p and p!#
with  equal  probabilities  and  therefore  he  should  prefer  c2  to  c1  according  to  the 
substitution axiom. 
However is it really plausible to conclude that c2 is preferred to c1 as required by the 
substitution axiom, regardless of how strong is the preference of (p!, 47) over (p, 47)? 
Suppose  for  a  moment  that  the  decision  maker  were  instead  indifferent  between  
(p!, 47) and (p, 47).  Then the patient may take the treatment since he values the gain 
in knowledge ahead.  If he takes the treatment he does not have to worry which of the 
two dreadful events will happen with high probability. This gives him an opportunity 
to adjust emotionally to his likely fate.  Moreover it will be easier for him to prepare 
for the future after 50 months.  He can learn to read and write Braille in this time and 
does not have to think about how to cope with the complete loss of balance. 
We now return to the assumption that the patient would prefer the unavailable choice 
c0 over c1.  Suppose that the intensity of this preference is low and the dislike of not 
knowing which of the two bad events will occur is so strong that it outweighs the 
influence of the preference of c0 over c1.  The patient will then choose to take the 
treatment since he hates the uncertainty of c2 so much that he is willing to choose 
blindness with probability .9 in spite of a slight preference for a complete loss of 
balance.    We  can  conclude  that  violations  of  the  substitution  axiom  can  be  quite 
reasonable.  They cannot be excluded as irrational. 
Note that the patient’s dislike of not knowing which bad outcome will occur has 
nothing to do with ambiguity aversion.  Ambiguity aversion means that the patient 
dislikes not knowing the distribution.  In the example of Table 2 the patient knows the 
distribution  of  each  choice  exactly.    What  the  patient  dislikes  is  that  the  exactly 
known distribution c2 in which there are two different bad possible outcomes, is non-
degenerate. 
Our example is sufficient as a direct refutation of the idea that a rational decision 
maker  must  obey  the  substitution  axiom.    This  direct  refutation  complements  an 
earlier finding in this section.  Our earlier finding is that the substitution axiom of 
Kreps and Porteus (1978) and the limit property, together with some uncontroversial 
assumptions on the preference order, jointly preclude preferences from depending on 
resolution times. 
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8. Primary and secondary satisfactions and their role in SKAT  
A basic distinction between primary and secondary satisfactions is made by SKAT, 
the Stages of Knowledge Ahead Theory, Pope (1983), Pope (2001), Pope (2004), 
Pope (2006), Pope, Leitner and Leopold (2006, 2009).  The term knowledge ahead 
refers to what the decision maker knows about the future.  A degenerate probability 
distribution means full knowledge ahead – certainty.  A non-degenerate probability 
distribution means limited knowledge ahead – risk, uncertainty.  Each stage in the 
theory ends with a change in knowledge ahead.  The term satisfactions is used in a 
wide sense, also including dissatisfactions.  (One may think of dissatisfactions as 
negative satisfactions.)   
Beginning with Pascal in the seventeenth century, Pope (2001) surveys the numerous 
terminologies  used  for  the  partition  of  satisfactions  anticipated  to  be  experienced 
during chronological time into primary and secondary, the misleading connotations, 
the  confusions  and  associated  misclassifications  to  which  each  terminology  was 
subject, and decided that a new terminology would be helpful.   
Primary satisfactions derive from specific outcomes of a choice and depend neither on 
probabilities nor their resolution time.  They are independent of knowledge ahead at 
any stage.  Examples of primary satisfactions are pleasures and displeasures from 
consumption and state of health.  Of course, what is considered to be a source of 
primary  satisfaction  depends  on  the  concrete  decision  situation  and  the  degree  of 
detail in which it is modelled.   
Secondary satisfactions depend on the probabilities of specific outcomes and / or on 
resolution time, in other words on what is known about the future.  They include 
certainty effects experienced in chronological time from full knowledge ahead, and 
uncertainty effects experienced in chronological time from limited knowledge ahead.  
The concept of secondary satisfactions (in an earlier terminology “utility of chance”) 
can be defined with respect to the satisfaction derived from the distribution, as in 
Pope (1984), or more simply with respect to the satisfaction from each outcome as 
that satisfaction is affected by the distribution as in Pope (1995).  When the term risk 
includes the border case of risk reduced to zero (and thus certainty effects experienced 
in chronological time), both definitions partition the set of satisfactions identically 
between primary and secondary satisfactions. 
For the new terminology, the term secondary was not selected in order to connote that 
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that they derive from primary satisfactions – from concern at what will or may be 
primary satisfactions in the future, and from what were and might have been primary 
satisfactions in the past. Secondary satisfactions may arise from emotional responses 
to the uncertain evolution of the choice situation over time, like fear of or hope for 
some  future  events.  We  call  such  secondary  satisfactions  emotional.    SKAT  also 
considers  non-emotional  secondary  satisfactions  such  as  inter-temporal  planning 
inefficiencies and inability to commit unconditionally to repay a loan or complete a 
task when the future is uncertain.  Such secondary satisfactions are called material. 
SKAT describes how knowledge ahead, or in other words what is known about the 
future,  changes  over  time.    In  the  course  of  dealing  with  a  problem  there  is  an 
evolution in what is unknown at each stage and what progressively becomes known 
about  the  future.  It  is  necessary  to  distinguish  at  least  three  stages  of  knowledge 
ahead.   
Stage 0 :  The Pre-Decision Stage – before a choice is made and thus when the 
decision maker has limited knowledge ahead of which choice he will 
make 
Stage 1 :  The Pre-Outcome Stage – before the risk is resolved of which of the 
various possible outcomes in the choice will occur and thus when the 
decision maker has limited knowledge ahead about what will be the 
outcome of the choice 
Stage 2 :  The Post-Outcome Stage when the risk concerning which outcome of 
that choice will occur has been resolved even if the outcome has not 
yet  occurred,  and  thus  when  the  decision  maker  will  have  full 
knowledge ahead (certainty) of the outcome of the (previously risky) 
choice 
 
At  the  beginning  of  Stage  0  the  decision  maker  is  ignorant  of  what  choices  are 
available and ignorant of what he will choose.  By the end of Stage 0 the decision 
maker knows what choices are available and what the utility of each choice is.  Then 
at t = 0 the decision is made and his knowledge ahead enters stage 1 of knowing what 
he has chosen.  In stage 1 the decision is irrevocably fixed but risk is still unresolved 
since  he  has  limited  knowledge  ahead  of  which  outcome  will  eventuate.  All  risk 
concerning which particular outcome will occur from his choice is resolved at the 
resolution time ! so that there is full knowledge ahead concerning the outcome.  That 
is, Stage 2 begins at this point. Pope Selten Risk and EUT    11:37 AM, Saturday, 28 November 2009  26 
Pope  (1996/7  pp292-3)  subdivides  the  Pre-Decision  stage  into  two  processes  (i) 
generating  options  and  (ii)  generating  decision  rules  for  evaluating  options  and 
evaluating options.  Pope, Leopold and Leitner (2006, figure 5.2, p30) subdivide the 
pre-decision stage into two, namely into a pre-choice set stage and the remainder a 
pre-decision stage during which the available choices are evaluated.  The phrase “pre-
choice set” refers to the process of ascertaining by search and negotiation the set of 
available choices.   
The subdivision of stage 0 is based on a picture of the decision process involving 
consecutive activities: first the construction of the set of available choices; and then 
the construction of rules for evaluating choices and the evaluation of these choices by 
those rules.  However SKAT does not require that this process is strictly sequential.  
Rather the process will normally involve a degree of toing and froing since, apart 
from anything else, the matter of evaluating options typically results in needing to 
specify the options more precisely in some respects than was initially realised.   
Further SKAT does not exclude path-dependent satisficing and aspiration-adaptation 
in the Pre-Decision Stage 1.  Satisficing (Simon 1954) is a search for alternatives in 
which, as soon as it is found, a choice is evaluated and, if on evaluation it reaches the 
satisficing  threshold,  chosen  without  expending  time  and  resources  to  ascertain  if 
there are available other better choices.  Under aspiration adaptation theory, before 
encountering  a  particular  decision  situation,  the  chooser  has  identified  a  set  of 
conceivable options for altering his current situation and made an order of urgency as 
regards  improvements,  and  as  regards  a  retreat  variable.    Thus  each  time  a  firm 
completes its search procedure of discovering what is feasible, it has no additional 
evaluation to do.  If it discovered that moving up is feasible, it already knows that if it 
has to choose between different upward directions, and already knows which upward 
directions are higher on its urgency scale.  Again, if retreating is all that is feasible, 
our firm already knows its retreat variable.  It has no need to do an evaluation in order 
to discover its desired advance or retreat steps. (Sauermann and Selten 1962, Selten 
1998, 1999, Selten, Pittnauer and Hohnisch 2008).   
In the case of a sure choice, all risk is resolved at t = 0.  Therefore in this case stage 1 
is missing.  Stage 0 is immediately followed by stage 2. In the following it will be 
assumed that the choice under consideration is risky. This has the consequence ! > 0. 
There is a pre-outcome stage of at least one period. In stage 1 the decision maker 
knows the choice she has taken but she does not yet know which outcome will be 
realized.  This becomes known at the resolution time !, when the post-outcome stage 
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We now turn our attention to the evaluation of choices in SKAT.  The evaluation 
procedure determines a value u(p0, !) for every available choice c = (p0, !).  In this 
paper we restrict our attention to the case where u(p0, !) is a real number, the utility  
of c = (p0, !).  Multi-dimensional values could also be considered, but they are beyond 
the scope of this paper. 
The value u(p0, !) of a choice (p0, !) is the final result of a stepwise procedure in 
which successively broader aggregates of satisfactions are formed.  Table 3 provides a 
list of the notation of the parts of u(p0, !) entering this aggregation. Table 4 orders 
these parts by stage and level of aggregation to provide an overview of how these 
parts combine to form u(p0, !). 
 
Table 3: Notation for parts of the Utility of a Choice in SKAT 
 
x1!  pre-resolution part of an outcome x in the pre-outcome stage 1, common to all 
x with p0(x) > 0  
x2!  post-resolution part of an outcome x in the post-outcome stage 2, different for 
each different x 
   
v1(x1#)  primary satisfactions in pre-outcome stage 1, common to all x with p0(x) > 0 
v2(x2#)  primary satisfactions of a particular outcome x in post-outcome stage 2 
_ 
v2(p0, !)  aggregate primary satisfactions in post-outcome stage 2 
v(p0, !)  total primary satisfactions 
   
w1(x1!, p0)  secondary satisfactions in pre-outcome stage 1, common to all x with p0(x) > 0 
w2(x2!, p0)  secondary satisfactions of a particular outcome x in post-outcome stage 2 
_ 
w2(p0, !)  aggregate secondary satisfactions in post-outcome stage 2 
w(p0, !)  total secondary satisfactions 
   




          Table 4: parts of the Utility of a Choice 
  Pre-outcome stage 1  Post-outcome stage 2  total 
    particular outcome x  Aggregate over x  " X   
primary  v1(x1#)  v2(x2#)             _ 
v2(p0, !)  v(p0, #) 
secondary  w1(x1!, p0)  w2(x2!, p0) 
           _ 
w2(p0, !)  w(p0, #) 
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With respect to a resolution time !, with 0 < ! < T, every outcome x  " X can be split 
into two parts, x1! and x2!.  The first part is x1!, the pre-resolution part of x that occurs 
before ! in the pre-outcome stage 1.  The second part is x2!, the post-resolution part of 
x that occurs during the post-outcome stage 2 that begins at !.  The pre-resolution part 
x1! consists of the first ! segments s1, … s#(1 of x and the post-resolution part consists of 
the remaining segments s#, … s)  of x.  
Every x with p0(x) > 0 has the same pre-outcome stage 1 part x1!.  (See part 3 of the 
result at the end of section 3.)  Primary satisfactions received in stage 1 are a function 
v1(x1#) of this common pre-resolution part.  Even if this is not formally expressed, 
v1(x1#)  should  be  thought  of  as  an  aggregate  of  disparate  primary  satisfactions 
anticipated to be experienced in the segments of x1#.   Primary satisfactions anticipated 
to  be  experienced  in  the  post-outcome  stage  2  for  a  particular  outcome  x  are  a 
function v2(x2#) of the post-resolution part x2# of x, and are sub-aggregates, aggregated 
over each mutually exclusive x with p0(x) > 0 to form 
! 
v2(p0, !).  How this is done is 
left unspecified. 
The primary satisfactions v1(x1#) of the pre-outcome stage 1 and 
! 
v2(p0, !) of the post-
outcome stage 2 are then combined to form total primary satisfactions v(p0, #).  Again, 
how this is done is left unspecified.   
Secondary  satisfactions  can  only  be  anticipated  and  formulated  after  primary 
satisfactions have been formed.  In order to fear a bad outcome or hope for a good 
one, it has to be known which outcomes are good or bad and this is judged in terms of 
their primary satisfactions. 
Unlike  the  primary  satisfactions  v1(x1#)  and  v2(x2#),  the  secondary  satisfactions  
w1(x1!, p0) and w2(x2!, p0) do not depend solely on x1# and x2# respectively, but also on 
p0.  In the pre-outcome stage 1 a bad outcome may be feared less the smaller is its 
probability in stage 1, and in the post-outcome stage 2, elation at a good outcome may 
be more intense the smaller its probability was in stage 1. 
Actually x1! is redundant in the notation for secondary satisfactions w1(x1!, p0) in pre-
outcome stage 1 since x1! is uniquely determined by p0.  However for the sake of an 
intuitive notation we retain x1! as an argument of w1.   
In the same way as the primary satisfactions v1(x1#) are an aggregate, the secondary 
satisfactions w1(x1!, p0) is an aggregate of the disparate secondary satisfactions of the 
segments  of  x1!  in  the  pre-outcome  stage  1.    An  analogous  statement  holds  for 
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The secondary satisfactions w2(x2!, p0) are aggregated over x " X to 
! 
w2(p0, !).  Then 
the secondary satisfactions w1(x1#) of stage 1 and 
! 
w2(p0, !) of stage 2 are combined to 
form total secondary satisfactions w(p0, #).  
Finally the total utility of the choice u(p0, #) is formed from v(p0, #) and w(p0, #).  
Again the precise way in which these aggregations and combinations are done is 
intentionally  left  unspecified  in  order  to  leave  room  for  adjustments  to  specific 
contexts.   
Remarks on aggregation of mutually exclusive outcomes in the post-outcome stage 2:  
In the post-outcome stage 2, in the case of a risky choice, satisfactions differ for each 
mutually exclusive x with p0(x) > 0.  The formation of the aggregates of primary 
satisfactions 
! 
v2(p0, !) and secondary satisfactions 
! 
w2(p0, !).  thus involve mutually 
exclusive outcomes x.  This means that, compared to the stage 1 aggregates v1(x1#) and 
v2(x1#) an additional tier of aggregation is required, that over each mutually exclusive x 
with p0(x) > 0.  This merits additional attention in view of the widespread confusion in 
the  literature  of  aggregation  procedures  involving  probability  weights  with  the 
inclusion of secondary satisfactions in the mapping from outcomes into utilities. 
This  second  tier  of  aggregation  can  take  the  form  of  an  atemporal  weighting 
procedure that gives a fractional weight at t = 0, that, depending on x and p0, is 
allocated to each of these mutually exclusive outcomes.  Such weights can take many 
different forms.  There can be an ultra conservative of putting all the weight on the 
worst possible outcome and ignoring all the other possible outcomes.  There can be an 
ultra optimistic weighting of putting all the weight on the best possible outcome.  
There can be some intermediate form of weighting in between the extremes such as 
the various sorts of probability weighting of rank dependent theories that give more 
weight to bad outcomes as in most rank dependent theories (Quiggin 1982, Allais 
1988, Tversky and Kahneman 1992), or to both good and bad outcomes, (Lopes 1984, 
Lopes and Oden 1999). 
Decision scientists generally fail to make the distinction between: 
a)   the atemporal derivative usage of probabilities for aggregating alternatives 
in rank dependent theories, and  
b)  the denotation of probabilities as the decision maker’s degree of knowledge 
ahead at particular times.   
Pope (1983) and (1995) demonstrate how to make this distinction, and how, once the 
plausibility and reasonableness of including secondary satisfactions is admitted, there 
are  neither  descriptive  nor  normative  grounds  for  performing  the  atemporal 
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determined on a case by case basis concerning the range of outcomes and the decision 
maker’s preferences.   
The distinction between a) the atemporal derivative usage of probabilities as weights 
and b), probabilities as measures of the decision maker’s degree of knowledge ahead 
means that the matter of atemporal weighting of mutually exclusive alternatives is 
distinct from the issue of consistently including secondary satisfactions within SKAT, 
as explained in Pope (1983), (1995) and Pope, Leopold and Leitner (2006, p. 55-57).  
This is because atemporal weighting by probabilities may or may not occur forming 
the aggregate of primary satisfactions 
! 
v2(p0, !).  Thus we may have  
! 
v2(p0, !)  =  
 p(x)v2(x2#) 
       
x " X   
Likewise these are examples of a special model within SKAT in which probability 
weights p0(x) are used in Stage 2 also for the aggregation of the mutually exclusive 
secondary satisfactions w2(x, !) for each different x into w3(p0, !),   
! 
w2(p0, !)  = 
 p(x)w2(x2#) 
          x " X   
But SKAT does not recommend aggregation by probability weights for most decision 
situations.  The above examples are given as in earlier papers to assist in ending the 
widespread current practice of speaking about the utility of a choice outside EUT as 
“non-linear  in  probabilities”  without  distinguishing  between  the  two  classes  of 
theories.  One class of theories, namely standard rank dependent theories, generalises 
EUT  by  allowing  generalisations  of  EUT’s  atemporal  probability  weights  but 
excludes secondary satisfactions.  The other class of theories, of which SKAT is an 
epistemically consistent example, includes secondary satisfactions.  Within this other 
class, SKAT is eclectic, an umbrella theory that permits all secondary satisfactions 
and all atemporal aggregation rules for the mutually exclusive outcomes in Stage 2.  
By contrast, many other theories, such as Kreps and Porteus (1978), Caplin and Leahy 
(2001)  and  Klibanoff  and  Ozdenoren  (2007)  are  less  eclectic  both  as  regards  the 
secondary satisfactions included (excluding important sets of secondary satisfactions 
due  to  the  axiomatic  restrictions  of  their  substitution  axiom  as  itemised  in  Pope, 
Leitner and Leopold (2006)), and non-eclectic as regards the atemporal aggregation 
weights  (imposing  atemporal  aggregation  by  simple  probability  weights).    For 
understanding and researching what influences choice and giving policy advice, it is 
crucial that these two classes of theories need to be kept distinct.  Note that in both 
Stage 1 and in Stage 2, aggregates may be formed by automatic intuitive judgment 
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Many details are left unspecified in the description of the evaluation of a choice. 
Details may depend on the context and may vary from decision maker to decision 
maker. A careful analysis of every concrete decision situation is much more important 
than a premature specification of a precise mathematical form. 
 
9.  A Model by Caplin and Leahy    
In this section we want to describe a version of a model proposed by Caplin and 
Leahy (2001). The additional notation introduced to analyse the Caplin and Leahy 
model is in an alphabetical list of symbols, Table A2.2 of Appendix 2. Their approach 
is similar to that of SKAT, even if they apply axiomatized expected utility theory.  
They take the point of view that all satisfactions and dissatisfactions are emotional 
and that therefore the utility of a choice should only depend emotional states. The 
emotional state is assumed to depend on the current physical outcome segment and on 
anticipations of the future.  Caplin and Leahy develop a two-period model based on 
these ideas. 
They assume that the outcome set is infinite.  We shall present a simplified version of 
the model of Caplin and Leahy in which the outcome set is finite.  This will permit us 
to connect the model with the simple temporal framework and use of the definitions 
and notations of section 2. However some additional definitions and notations will 
have to be introduced. 
Since the model of Caplin and Leahy has two periods we have T = 2.  For every 
outcome x " X let s1(x) be the first segment and s2(x) be the second segment of x. Let 
m1 and m2 be emotional states of periods 1 and 2 respectively. The emotional state 
depends on the currently experienced segment and the anticipated emotional states in 
the future and their probabilities. In period 2 there are no anticipated future emotional 
states. Therefore the emotional state m2 depends only on the segment s2(x) of the 
realized outcome x.  This enables us to identify m2 with s2(x).  Without any loss of 
generality: 
  m2 = s2(x). 
One may think of an outcome x as specified by a first physical segment s1(x) and a 
second emotional segment m2 = s2(x).  
Suppose the decision maker takes a choice c = (p0, !). As we have seen in section 2, 
every outcome x " X with p0(x) > 0 has the same first segment.  If c is a sure choice, 
this is due to the fact that there is only one outcome x with p0(x) > 0. For a risky 
choice this follows from Conclusion (iii) in section 3.  The first segment common to 
all outcomes p0(x) > 0 is uniquely determined. We call this segment the first segment 
realized by p0 and denote it s1(p0). Of course, the function s1(p0) is only defined for 
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The emotional state m1 for the first period depends on the first segment s1(p0) and on 
the probability distribution over m2 = s2(x) which is uniquely determined by p0: 
  m1  = *(s1(p0), p0) 
Consequently m1 can be described as a function of p0 alone: 
  m1 = +(p0) 
We call + the generating function for m1.  For a given choice c = (p0, !) this function 
directly  connects  the  emotional  state  m1  in  the  first  period  to  the  probability 
distribution p0. 
We shall refer to a pair m = (m1, m2) of two emotional states for periods 1 and 2 as an 
emotional  future.    Caplin  and  Leahy  think  of  emotional  states  as  vectors  in  a 
Euclidian space. The components may be intensities of emotions or similar variables 
which  at  least  in  principle  permit  physiological  measurement.  In  their  model  the 
emotional states m1 and m2 for periods 1 and 2 are elements of two convex subsets M1 
and M2 of a Euclidian space.  In our version of the model, we also assume that M1 and 
M2 are compact (closed and bounded).  The set of all m = (m1, m2) is denoted by M.  
Obviously all emotional futures are elements of M.  Caplin and Leahy assume that the 
decision maker has a complete and transitive preference order   over all probability 
distributions M. 
Consider a choice c = (p0, !).  What distribution g over M results from taking the 
choice?  We shall look at this question.  For any distribution p0 over the outcome set, 
let R2(p0) be the set of all second segments s2 such that  
x = (s1(p0), s2) 
is an outcome in X with p0(x) > 0.  We call R2(p0) the second segment reservoir or for 
brevity the reservoir of p0. It can be seen that the probability g(m) of m = (m1, m2) if g 
is chosen is as follows: 
 
! 
g(m)   =   
p0(s1(p0), s2)              for m1 =  "(p0) and m2 # R2(p0)






This  distribution  g(m)  is  called  the  distribution  over  M  generated  by  the  choice  
c = (p0, !).  The set of all g generated by a choice is denoted G. 
Let f be a probability distribution specifying positive probabilities f(m) for all m in a 
finite subset K(f) of M and specifying a probability of zero for all subsets of M not 
intersecting K(f).  The set K(f) is called the carrier of f.  Probability distributions of 
this  kind  are  called  distributions  with  a  finite  carrier.    This  definition  excludes 
continuous or partially continuous distributions that assign probability densities rather 
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finite carrier is denoted F.  Obviously G is a subset of F.  For our version of the model 
it is therefore sufficient to look at the preference relations   defined for pairs of 
distributions in F. 
Let u be a utility function defined on M and extended to F by (I) 





It is clear that this equation simply restates the expectations property introduced in 
section  4.    We  say  that  a  utility  function  u  defined  on  M  is  timewise  additively 
separable if for every m = (m1, m2) in M we have 
   (IV)  u(m) = u1(m1) + u2(m2) 
where u1and u2 are continuous partial utility functions defined on M1 and M2 and 
respectively.   
Caplin  and  Leahy  proceed  from  a  system  of  axioms  imposed  on  the  preference 
relationship   over general distributions over M.  The axioms yield the conclusion 
that a preference relationship which can be represented by a utility function with the 
expectations property (I) can also be represented by a utility function u satisfying (I) 
and (IV). 
In this paper we do not want to describe the axiom system of Caplin and Leahy for 
their utility function in detail.  However it is important to say something about the 
crucial role of two of these axioms. 
The first one of these two axioms is the substitution axiom (Assumption I (ii), Caplin 
and  Leahy  2001,  p.61),  essentially  the  same  one  as  discussed  in  section  6.    The 
substitution axiom is crucial for the expectation property (I).  The second of these two 
axioms assumes indifference between two probability distributions over M with the 
same marginal distributions on M1 and M2.  A precise statement of this marginal 
distribution axiom can be found in Appendix 5. There a proposition is proved that for 
our  version  of  the  model  of  Caplin  and  Leahy  the  marginal  substitution  axiom 
together with (I) implies the timewise additive separability property (IV). 
The approach of Caplin and Leahy looks at decision making as a two layer process. 
The  first  layer  describes  how  a  distribution  of  physical  outcomes  connected  to  a 
choice leads to a distribution over emotional futures. The second layer concerns the 
selection of a choice by the maximization of expected utility. In this way they achieve 
a  clear  separation  of  psychological  assumptions  about  the  pre-rational  genesis  of 
emotional states on the one hand and the postulated rationality of the preference order 
over distributions of emotional futures on the other hand. 
The two layer structure results in a high degree of flexibility. In their paper Caplin and 
Leahy apply their model to the influence of anxiety on asset pricing. Moreover they 
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interpret them in the light of their model.    Undoubtedly their paper is an important 
contribution to decision theory.  Nevertheless some critical points need to be raised.  
This will be done in the next section. 
 
10. Remarks on the model by Caplin and Leahy 
In the following we shall present three remarks on the model by Caplin and Leahy.  In 
these remarks we shall refer to our versions of the model of Caplin and Leahy as 
presented in the previous section and to the axioms stated in Appendix 5. It will be 
clear to every reader familiar with the paper by Caplin and Leahy that the objections 
also apply to their more general form of the model.   
10.1 The Region on which preferences are defined. 
In the model of Caplin and Leahy the decision maker is assumed to have preferences 
over  arbitrary  probability  distributions  over  M.  In  our  version  of  their  theory  we 
consider only distributions f in the set F of distributions with finite carriers. 
Consider the set G of distributions that result from the choice set C.  As we have seen 
the distributions in G have very special carriers.  All emotional futures m = (m1, m2) in 
such a carrier must have the same first part m1. For any reasonable measure over M 
the probability that a randomly selected carrier with n elements (n " 2) is a carrier of a 
distribution in G is zero.  In this sense almost all distributions are not in G. 
It is sufficient for the decision maker to have preferences defined on G. Why should 
she be forced to form preferences over all pairs of distributions f and g in the vastly 
larger set F? Distributions in G but not in F arise from pseudo choices rather than 
choices. Any interpretation in terms of a possible choice is bound to be contradictory.  
Preference judgments involving pseudo choices are not natural. It is not reasonable to 
require that a rational decision maker should make preference judgments concerning 
impossible distributions over emotional futures. 
10.2 Use of the substitution axiom 
Caplin and Leahy (2001) make use of a substitution axiom (Assumption 1(ii), p.61). 
As has been explained in section 7 there are serious objections against the substitution 
axiom. This axiom lacks a reasonable interpretation.  The weights ß and 1-ß of p and 
p' in the substitution axiom (see section 7) cannot be interpreted as probabilities with 
a temporal extension. 
Example 2, presented in section 7, was a direct argument against a substitution axiom 
in the theory of Kreps and Porteus (1978, 1979).  This argument loses its force in the 
context  of  the  theory  of  Caplin  and  Leahy,  since  they  do  not  apply  their  axioms 
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Nevertheless  the  more  basic  objection  concerning  the  lack  of  a  reasonable 
interpretation remains valid. 
10.3 Formation of Preferences   
The model of Caplin and Leahy conveys the impression that the generating function is 
looked  upon  as  the  description  of  an  automatic  process  not  involving  evaluative 
judgment  or  deliberation.    This  process  transforms  a  choice  to  a  probability 
distribution  over  emotional  futures.  Preference  judgments  concerning  such 
distributions  are  then  used  in  order  to  select  one  of  the  available  choices.    The 
preference  relationship  is  assumed  to  satisfy  a  system  of  rational  axioms.    This 
suggests that the formation of preferences involves rational cogitation. 
The emergence of an emotional future is modelled behaviourally but preferences over 
distributions of emotional futures are dealt with in the usual rationalistic fashion of 
axiomatized expected utility theory. This extreme difference between the two layers 
of the model of Caplin and Leahy does not seem to be plausible. 
In contrast to the model of Caplin and Leahy, SKAT describes the utility of a choice 
as the result of a stepwise procedure of forming aggregates of primary and secondary 
satisfactions.  (See section 8.)  Instead of the neat separation into an automatic step 
and a rational step in the decision process as modelled by Caplin and Leahy, the 
evaluation procedure of SKAT permits a combination of emotional response, intuitive 
judgment and rational deliberation at every step, without being too precise about the 
role of each of these mental activities.  Satisfactions and dissatisfactions certainly 
have an emotional aspect as indicated by the everyday meaning of the words but they 
are also influenced by intuitive judgment and rational deliberation. 
Axiomatized  expected  utility  theory  remains  silent  about  the  way  in  which 
preferences are formed.  The decision maker is assumed to have a preference book in 
his head in which preference intensities can be looked up without much effort, like 
numbers in a telephone book.  This picture also seems to underlie the upper layer of 
the model by Caplin and Leahy.  SKAT rejects the axiomatic approach and instead of 
this tries to gain insight into how preferences are formed. 
 
11. Discussion  
This  paper  has  discussed  conceptual  issues  concerning  the  generalization  of 
axiomatized expected utility to temporal lotteries in the sense of Kreps and Porteus 
(1978).  For this purpose it was not necessary to go beyond a narrow subclass of 
temporal lotteries in which all risk is resolved at a resolution time ! and not before.  A 
temporal lottery of this kind can be described by a pair (p0, !) where p0 is a probability 
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However such a pair must satisfy an additional condition to be a choice in a decision 
situation.  The resolution time ! is zero if and only if p0 assigns probability 1 to one 
outcome and zero to all other outcomes.  Therefore the set of all possible choices is 
not convex. 
Axiomatizations of expected utility usually derive a representation theorem asserting 
two properties, the expectation property and the essential uniqueness property (see 
section 4).  As we have seen in section 5, the essential uniqueness does not hold for 
the simple temporal framework. The reason for this lack of convexity is not removed 
by the more general framework of Kreps and Porteus. 
The essential uniqueness property is important for the interpretation of utility as a 
cardinal quality.  However as long as the expectation property holds, it is still possible 
to  describe  decision  making  as  maximizing  expected  utility,  even  if  the  utility 
function is not unique up to the origin and the unit of measurement. Therefore one can 
take  the  point  of  view  that  the  essential  uniqueness  property  is  not  really  an 
indispensable feature of a generalized expected utility of temporal lotteries. 
However  the  essential  uniqueness  property  may  matter  for  welfare  judgments 
involving  interpersonal  comparisons  of  expected  utilities.    John  Harsanyi  (1955, 
1986b)  has  argued  that  interpersonal  preference  judgments  can  be  formed  by 
empathy.  A person with perfectly good eyesight must be able to form preference 
judgments comparing his or her present situation with that of a blind person.  This is 
necessary  for  judging  decision  alternatives  involving  the  risk  of  loosing  one’s 
eyesight.  Such judgments are made by empathy, i.e. “by putting oneself into the 
other’s  shoes”.    Empathy  can  also  be  used  to  form  counterfactual  preference 
judgments e.g. about what it would be worth to be 10 cm taller.  This presumably 
impossible increase in size is as much in the power of imagination as a possible loss 
of eyesight.  At least in principle a “universal utility function” applicable to every 
conceivable situation of a human being can be constructed. 
In  Harsanyi’s  utilitarianism  welfare  judgments  are  based  on  the  average  of  the 
universal utilities of all living human beings.  No difficulties arise in the theory if the 
universal utility function has the expectation property but not the essential uniqueness 
property.  However, if welfare depends not only on the average universal utility but 
also  on  a  measure  of  dispersion  like  the  variance  of  the  distribution  of  universal 
utilities, then the essential uniqueness property becomes important. 
As has been argued in section 3, the modified expectation property (I') is the only 
natural generalization of the expectation property (I). In the same section a further 
requirement, the limit property (III) has been introduced. The limit property is nothing 
more than a natural extension of continuity. It has been shown that a utility function 
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expectation property (I') and the limit property (III).  However the whole purpose of a 
utility theory for temporal lotteries is to capture the influence of resolution times. 
Therefore, one of the two properties has to be dropped.  In our view the limit property 
has a greater intuitive appeal.  The modified expectation property has to be given up. 
In our view the limit property is a decisive argument against the utility theory for 
temporal lotteries axiomatized by Kreps and Porteus (1978).  Their theory permits 
resolution time dependence, but not in a reasonable way.  The restriction of their 
theory to the simple temporal framework satisfies the modified expectation property 
and  therefore  does  not  have  the  limit  property  unless  utility  does  not  depend  on 
resolution time, but only on the initial probability over outcomes. 
The axiomatization of Kreps and Porteus (1978) makes use of a substitution axiom.  
In section 7 we argued that this substitution axiom has no reasonable interpretation.  
The axiom makes an assertion about a mixture of two choices without offering a 
substantive interpretation of the weights in the mixture.  In the theory of temporal 
lotteries every probability is connected to a resolution time.  Therefore the weights 
cannot be interpreted as probabilities. 
Section 7 also presents an example indicating why it would be wrong to impose the 
substitution axiom even if it had a substantive interpretation. 
Sections 6 and 7 have shown that there are serious objections to the axiomatic theory 
of Kreps and Porteus (1978).  The same criticism also applies to later papers e.g. 
Klibanoff  and  Ozdenoren  (2066).    In  our  view  the  axiomatic  approach  to  choice 
among temporal lotteries remains unsatisfactory.  Axiomatic theories assume that the 
preference  relationship  satisfies  some  plausible  properties  and  then  derive  a 
representation theorem on this basic.  Maybe a fundamentally different approach to 
modelling rational choice of a temporal lottery in more promising.  Instead of taking 
plausible properties of the preference relationship as a point of departure one can ask 
oneself how preferences are constructed from more basic elements.  SKAT, the Stages 
of Knowledge Ahead Theory (Pope, Leitner, Leopold 2007) provides a picture of the 
decision process proceeding from primary to secondary satisfactions and finally to 
evaluations  of  choices  in  the  simple  temporal  framework.    SKAT  is  described  in 
section 8. 
SKAT does not aim at a full description of the decision process but leaves much room 
for modelling detail to be developed as appropriate in the application to concrete 
cases.  This avoids assuming that for all decision situations the same model details 
and way of reaching a solution will be identical.  However in SKAT the distinction 
between primary and secondary satisfactions is fundamental in guiding the modelling 
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The two-period model by Caplin and Leahy (2001) portrays the decision process as 
composed of two levels.  The first layer determines emotional futures for every choice 
in the decision situation by a pre-rational psychological mechanism.  On the second 
level the final choice is determined rationally by expected utility maximization.  In a 
sense all satisfactions are secondary in the model.  In our view the neat separation of 
the two layers does not sufficiently take into account the complexity of the interaction 
of automatic psychological reactions and rational deliberation.  In this respect SKAT 
seems to offer a better picture of the decision process.  Our critical objections against 
the  model  of  Caplin  and  Leahy  have  been  made  and  need  not  be  repeated  here. 





Alternative Concepts of a Certainty Effect 
In his responses to two choices posed by Allais in 1952, Savage violated expected utility theory.  In his 
historical retrospective on why he violated a theory to which he had recently converted, Savage (1954) 
explained that he was attracted to a guaranteed good outcome, that he liked to be certain of this.  He 
reported that he still felt an intuitive attraction to the choice of a guaranteed good outcome, even 
though he had subsequently decided that this was a mistake. The liking of Savage and many others for 
a guaranteed good outcome is something excluded by the axioms of expected utility theory, including 
Savage’s own 1954 dual axiomatization of utilities and probabilities under expected utility theory. 
Allais’ first asked Savage to choose between being guaranteed a good outcome, and almost guaranteed 
a better one. Savage’s choice was the guaranteed good outcome.  Allais next asked Savage to choose 
between  two  risky  outcomes,  one  a  little  more  risky  but  with  an  even  better  possible  outcome.  
Savage’s choice was the riskier one.   
Allais’ method of convincing Savage that his pair of answers to the two choices violated expected 
utility theory was the following.  Given his choice of the riskier option only when no good sure choice 
was available revealed a disproportionate increment in utility from being sure of the good outcome – 
disproportionate compared to what expected utility theory implies.   
This disproportionate increment  in  utility revealed by Allais’ pair of questions  might be termed a 
certainty effect.  It can arise in two main ways or by a combination of the two main ways, Pope (1995). 
One way is outside chronological time and does not require an epistemically temporal framework in 
order to discern its operation.  The second way requires an epistemically temporal framework. 
This first way is through the atemporal aggregation of the mutually exclusive outcomes.  Additional 
weight is placed on the bad outcome relative to its probability.  When all the weight is placed on 
reducing the risk of the worst possible outcome, one has minimax theory.  Savage however did not 
conform to this theory in his answers to Allais.  If Savage could not eliminate entirely the risk of the 
worst outcome, his choice was the riskier option with its possibility of an even better outcome. 
When merely more weight is placed on it than its probability implies, one has subjective expected 
utility theory of Edwards (1955).  Edward’s “overweighting” of the worst outcome assumption recurs 
in the original prospect theory of Kahneman and Tversky (1979) and in rank dependent models such as 
Allais  (1988)  and  Tversky  and  Kahneman  (1992).    This  atemporal  “overweighting”  of  the  worst 
outcome has come to be termed a certainty effect since it puts more weight on avoiding the worst 
outcome than under expected utility theory.  As emphasised by Allais (1988) the “overweighting” can 
be reasonable, not a consequence of the person being irrational, but rather a consequence of the person 
choosing  a  different  more  conservative  atemporal  weighting  system  than  assumed  under  expected 
utility theory. 
While such atemporal “overweighting” the worst outcome can be reasonable – especially when the 
worst outcome entails death or bankruptcy, such “overweighting” does not conform with Savage’s 
(1954) account of what he meant by liking a guarantee.  Nor does it accord with his account how he 
employed his sure thing principle to reconcile this liking with changing his choices to conform to 
expected  utility  theory.    Savage  changed  his  preferences  by  inventing  what  he  termed  the  “extra 
logical” “loose” “clarifying” sure-thing principle to convert an almost sure alternative into a sure one.  
As  analysed  in  Pope  (1991a),  the  sure  thing  principle  involves  truncating  distributions  until  the 
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decision maker in his evaluation process.  The real choice (eg that offered by Allais) still involves risk.  
In short, applying the sure thing principle involves creating a delusion of certainty. 
Terming atemporal overweighting a certainty effect therefore has nothing to do with what appealed to 
Savage in the guaranteed good outcome.  Savage only persuaded himself to alter his choices when he 
used his sure thing principle to generate a delusion of complete certainty (and to declare that this let 
him better understand probability differences).  What then did Savage intuit as the “disproportionate” 
advantages of the guaranteed good outcome, disproportionate relate to expected utility theory?  Savage 
reports no specifics.   
The specifics may well have been those that can only be discerned in theories employing epistemically 
temporal frameworks that Savage (1954, chapter 2) decided to ignore since like his sure thing principle, 
they involve knowledge and possibility, concepts he wished to avoid.  The specifics may well have 
been  the  emotional  and/or  material  benefits  of  certainty  anticipated  to  be  experienced  during 
chronological time under the sure choice. Examples are feeling secure (an emotional satisfaction) and 
being able to commit 100% on a job or to repay a loan or to more efficiently intertemporally plan 
(material satisfactions).  Yet other examples are in Pope (2004, 2005, 2009, forthcoming) and Pope, 
Leitner and Leopold (2006, 2009).  These benefits are absent when the good outcome is less than 
certain.   
Such benefits from certainty drive a wedge between the “as if certain” interpretation of expected utility 
in  Friedman  and  Savage  (1948),  and  the  “independent  of  probabilities”  interpretation  in  Ramsey 
(1926), Pope (2004).  These benefits of a guaranteed good outcome are excluded under the Ramsey 
interpretation  of  expected  utility  but  are  included  under  the  Friedman  and  Savage  “as  if  certain” 
interpretation of expected utility theory.  Clearly Savage did not so apply his interpretation – or he 
would have disagreed with Allais that he had violated expected utility theory in his pair of choices.   
There are two obvious possibilities of why Savage did not think of this interpretation.  One is that 
Savage had not immersed himself in the specifics of his “as if certain” interpretation.  This accords 
with the fact that he accepted Allais’ algebraic proof.  Allais’ proof in fact holds only for the Ramsey 
interpretation of expected utility theory.   
Another possibility is that Savage realised that his “as if certain” interpretation involves treating risky 
outcomes as if certain and thus illusorily attributing to risky outcomes benefits of certainty (examples 
are in Pope 2004.  But Savage chose not to mention these awkward issues of impossible events being 
assumed by adherents to expected utility theory.  In this regard, on a related issue of impossible events 
being  imagined,  Aumann  asked  Savage  how  he  dealt  with  the  matter  that  his  axiomatization  of 
expected utility theory involves a states split in which a person could simultaneously be hanged on the 
gallows and in good health and reputation.  Savage’s response was: 
To some — perhaps to you — it will seem grotesque if I say that I should not mind 
being hung so long as it be done without damage to my health or reputation, but I 
think it desirable to adopt such language so that the danger of being hung can be 
contemplated in the framework of F. of S.  [Savage 1997 in Aumann 1997, p307] 






Alphabetical Listing by Symbol   
Notation introduced sections 1 to 3 for the simple temporal framework is in Table A2.1.  Where it 
seemed desirable, inclusive of a brief definition of the term, or description of its features is included.  
For fuller descriptions and definitions, see the text, sections 1 to 3.  The additional concepts introduced 
in section 8, are alphabetically listed in Tables 3 and 4 of that section. 
In section 4 and Appendix 4 in analysing epistemically atemporal expected utility theory we used the 
symbols ", " 1,, "2, x, y, X, p, c, C and D with analogous but different meanings from those above of 
the  simple  temporal  framework.    This  is  because  that  atemporal  framework  ignores  when  risk  is 
resolved in defining a choice and an outcome.  These analogous concepts for the atemporal framework 
of expected utility theory are defined in the second paragraph of section 4. 
In  this  appendix, Table A2.2  has t he  a ddi t i ona l  not a t i on i nt r oduc e d i n s e c t i on 9 a nd us e d a l s o i n 
sections 10 and Appendix 5 to analyse the model of Caplin and Leahy and one additional symbol 
introduced in section 7 to analyse the substitution axiom (essentially the same in the axiomatizations of 
Kreps and Porteus and in Caplin and Leahy.  In the case of these additional symbols, the matter that 
they are only introduced and used in sections 7 or in 9, 10 or in Appendix 5 is noted.  This avoids 
readers searching the initial sections when seeking a definition or fuller description of the concepts 
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Table A2.1: Notation for the Simple Temporal Framework  
(sections 1-3)* 
 
c  c = (p0, !) is a choice specified in terms of a probability distribution p0 over 
the outcomes, and a resolution time !  
C  the set of all conceivable choices 
D  a decision situation, a finite subset of C with at least two elements  
ex  the degenerate probability distribution with ex(x) = 1 and ey(y) = 0 for every 
y " X with y " x 
p0  the probability distribution at the point of choice t=0 
S  a finite segment set of the conceivable segments that can be elements of an 
outcome x 
st with t = 1, …,T  The t
th segment of an outcome x = (s1, … sT)  
!  a resolution time when the when the distribution p0 of x becomes degenerate 
t with t = 0, …, T  the time point t.  The point of choice is t=0.  For t = 0, …, T-1, the period t 
begins at t-1.  The last time point T does not belong to any period.   
u(p0, !)  the expected value of the utilities u(x, !) of a choice c where x is distributed 
according to p0 becomes degenerate at resolution time ! 
u(x, !)  the utility of a pair (x, !) of an outcome x and a resolution time !) 
(x, !)  a pair where x is an outcome and !, is a resolution time  
X  the finite set of all outcomes x 




Notation for the analysis of Caplin and Leahy’s Model  
(sections 9, 10) 
 
f  a distribution over M with a finite carrier 
F  the set of all distributions over M with a finite carrier 
g  A distribution over M generated by a choice c = (p0, !) 
G  the set of all distributions generated by choices c = (p0, !) 
K(f)  the carrier of f, the set of all m "M with f(m) > 0, if K(f) is finite 
m  m = (m1, m2), an emotional future,  a pair of two emotional states for 
periods 1 and 2 
mi  an emotional state for period i with i  = 1, 2 
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Table A2.2 continued 
Notation for the analysis of Caplin and Leahy’s Model  
(sections 9, 10)  
M1  the set of all possible emotional states for period m with i  = 1, 2 
M  the set of all m = (m1, m2) with m1"Mi for i  = 1, 2 
*(s1(p0), p0) = +(p0)  the generating function for the emotional state m1 for the first period  
R2(p0)  the second segment reservoir, the set of all second segments s2 such that  
x =(s1(p0), s2) 
s1(p0)  the common first segment of all x with p0(x) > 0 for a choice c = (p0, !) 
u(m)  the utility of an emotional future, with u(m) = u1(m1) + u2(m2)  
ui(mi)  the partial utility of an emotional state m1"Mi,with  i = 1, 2 
u(f)  the expected utility of a distribution f over M with a finite carrier 




Discussion of the Substitution Axiom’s Mixing Coefficient in Kreps and Porteus   
“The feature that most clearly distinguishes our treatment from previous work is its focus on 
the temporal aspect of uncertainty.  Our approach to dynamic choice problems and temporal 
lotteries explicitly models uncertainty as “attached” to a certain time.  Although reduction of 
compound uncertainty at a single time is implicit, reduction of uncertainty at several different 
times is not allowed.” [Kreps and Porteus 1978, opening three sentences of section 7]  
Comment: Since the mixing coefficient in the substitution axiom has no attached uncertainty resolution 
time, it is not a probability since as Kreps and Porteus themselves in their model, a probability has 
uncertainty attached to a certain time.  However the third sentence of the above citation from Kreps and 
Porteus claims that reduction of compound uncertainty at a single time is implicit.  This claim creates 
the  impression  that  the  mixing  coefficient  is  somehow  implicitly a  c o m p o u n d  g a m b l e  w h e n  t h e  
remainder of their sentence owns that it cannot be a compound gamble since that involves reduction of 
uncertainty at several different times, something not allowed in their model.  
 
Appendix 4 
The Essential Uniqueness of Utility in Atemporal Expected Utility Theory 
This appendix uses the notation of standardexpected utility theory of section 4. 
Proposition  
Let X be a finite non-empty outcome set and let C be the set of all probability distributions over X.  
Moreover let u be a utility function over C representing   with property (I). Then u also has property 
(II). 
Proof  
Without loss of generality we can assume  
    X  = {x1, … , xn} 
 and 
    u(x1) # u(x2) # … # u(xn) 
Consider first the trivial case of a constant utility u(xi) = u0 for  i = 1, …, n.  It is clear that (II) holds in 
this case. From now on assume u(xn) > u(x1).  For i = 1, … , n let $i be the number with  
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In view of u(x1) # u(xi) # u(xn) we must have  
0 # $i # 1 
Therefore for the probability distribution pi with pi(x1) = 1- $i  and  pi(xn) = $i , the decision maker is 
indifferent between this (non-degenerate) probability distribution and xi for sure.  This yields  
    u(pi) = u(x1) 
Let v be another utility function over C with the expectation property (I), which represents  .  In view 
of xi  ~ pi we have: 
v(xi)  = (1- $i) v(x1) + $i(xn) 
We obtain the following equation for $i  
! 














    b = v(x1) – au(x1) 
Since  u  and  v  represent  the  same  preference  order  ,  we  must  have  v(xn)  >  v(x1)  in  view  of  
u(xn) > u(x1). Therefore a > 0 holds. Multiplication of the equation for $i by  
  v(xn) – v(x1) = a(u(xn) – u(x1)) 
yields 
  v(xi) = au(xi) + b 
Therefore we have  
! 
v(p)  =   p(x)v(x)
x"X
#   =   p(x)[au(x)+ b]
x"X
#  
and consequently  
v(p) = au(p) + b 
for every p " C.  It follows that v is a positive linear transformation of u as required by the essential 
uniqueness property (II).  This completes the proof of the proposition. 
Remark: It is of crucial importance for the proof of proposition 1 that the probability distribution pi 
always is an element of C. The proof does not work unless C contains all probability distributions that 
assign positive probabilities to x1 and xn and to no other outcomes.  However, the proof does not require 
that C contain other probability distributions. 
 
Appendix 5 
The Marginal Distribution Axiom in Caplin and Leahy 
It is the purpose of this appendix to throw light on the crucial role of the marginal distribution axiom 
for the additive separability property (V) of the utility function u in the model of Caplin and Leahy 
(See section 9). As explained in section 9, in our version of this model we assume that the sets M1 and 
M2 o f  p o s s i b l e  e m o t i o n a l  s t a t e s  f o r  p e r i o d s  1  a n d  2 ,  r e s p e c t i v e l y  a r e  c o m p a c t  c o n v e x  s u bsets  of 
Euclidian space and M is the set of all emotional futures m = (m1, m2) with m1 " M1 and m2 " M2. 
Moreover the set of all probability distributions over M with finite carrier is denoted by F. 
Consider a probability distribution g " F.  Let K be the carrier of g.  For every first part m1 of an 
emotional future m = (m1, m2) " K, let L2(m1) be the set of all m2 with (m1, m2) " K.  Similarly for 
every second part m2 of an m " !, let L1(m2) be the set of all m1 with (m1, m2) " K.  Then the marginal 
distributions g1 and g2 of g with respect to M1 and M2 are defined as follows: 
! 
g1(m1) = g[(m1, m2)]
m2"L2(m1)
#   
! 
g2(m2) = g[(m1, m2)]
m1"L1(m2)
#  
Let g and h be two distributions in F with the property that g1 = h1 and let g2 = h2 hold for the marginal 
distributions g1, g2 of g and h1, h2 of h.  If this is the case we say that g and h agree with respect to their 
marginal distributions. 
Caplin and Leahy state the marginal distribution axiom as a property of the preference relation   
represented by u (Caplin and Leahy 2001, assumption 1 (iv), p.61).  For our purpose an equivalent 
version in terms of u is more convenient. Pope Selten Risk and EUT    11:37 AM, Saturday, 28 November 2009  43 
Marginal distribution axiom  
Let g and h be two distributions in F such that g and h agree with respect to their marginal 
distributions, then u(g) = u(h) holds. 
It is the aim of this appendix to prove a proposition about a continuous utility function u defined on M 
and  extended  to  F  by  the  expectation  property  (I)  in  section  4.   T h i s  p r o p o s i t i o n  2  c o n n e c t s  t h e  
timewise additive separability property of section 9 to the marginal distribution axiom. 
Proposition 2 
Let M1 and M2 be compact subsets of Euclidian space and let M be the set of all m = (m1, 
m2) with m1 " M1 and m2 " M2.  Let u be a continuous utility function defined on M and 
extended  to  F  by  the  expectation  property  (I)  in  section  4.  Moreover  let   b e  t h e  
preference  relation  over  M  represented  by  u.    Assume  that  u  satisfies  the  marginal 
distribution  axiom.    Then  continuous  functions  u1 a n d  u 2 d e f i n e d  o n  M 1 a n d  M 2, 
respectively, exist, such that 
  u(m) = u1(m1) + u2(m2) 
holds for every m = (m1, m2) " M1. 
Proof 
Since M is compact and u is continuous, the function u has a minimum u0 over M: 
  u0  =  min  u(m) 
          m " M 
Let m






0) b e  a  f i x e d  m i n i m i z e r  o f  u  i n  M .   ( T h e r e  m a y  b e  m o r e  t h a n  o n e  m i n i m i z e r . )      
For m = (m1, m2) define  
  u1(m) = u((m1, 
! 
m2






We shall show that u(m) = u1(m) + u2(m) holds for the partial utility functions u1 and u2 defined in this 





























2  for m = m0
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It can be seen immediately that g and h have the same marginal distributions g1 = h1 and g2 = h2.  The 
distribution  g1 =  h2 a s s i g n s  p r o b a b i l i t y  % t o  
! 
m1
0 a n d  
! 
m1
* a n d  z e r o  t o  a l l  o t h e r  e l e m e n t s  o f  M 1.  






* and zero to all other elements of M2.  It follows 




















* is an arbitrary element of M this equation holds for every m
* " M. This completes the proof 
of the proposition. 
 
Comment: Caplin and Leahy make use of an axiomatization of timewise additive expected utility taken 
from Fishburn (1982).  In his book Fishburn explains that the marginal distribution axiom is not really 
compelling.  He points out that a decision maker may not be indifferent between the distributions g and 





























0).  Then in g the decision maker is sure to get the better emotional state in at least one of the 
two states where as in h she may end up with the worse emotional state in both periods. Pope Selten Risk and EUT    11:37 AM, Saturday, 28 November 2009  44 
It is of course possible that the preferences of the decision maker are adequately represented by the 
expectation of a timewise additively separable utility function, but whether this the case or not has to 
be judged on the basis of the concrete context.  The marginal distribution axiom fails to be a property 
that must always be satisfied by the preferences of a rational person. 
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